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China's Belt and Road Initiative is
Reshaping Human Rights Norms
ABSTRACT

Since its birth in 2015, the Belt and Road Initiative has garnered
significant attention for its benefits and its detriments. Much of the

current scholarship in this area is focused on particularpieces of the
Belt and Road Initiative, with few in legal scholarshipconsidering the
impact of the relationship between China'sgrowing soft power and its
effect on international law and internationalinstitutions. Every state

has the right to pursue power and influence, but this Note specifically
examines how China's methods of obtainingthis power and influence-

specifically through the Belt and Road Initiative and related actions
within United Nations'organs-aredetrimental to human rights. This
Note offers a novel analysis of resolutions passed in the UN Human

Rights Council and the UN Security Council to shed light on emerging
soft law foundations that could justify future extreme acts, before

examining steps that states should take to address China's actions.
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INTRODUCTION

A small business owner, Alexis, wants to build a flower shop
storefront on a small piece of land she inherited from her parents.
Having run her shop out of her home for a couple of years, Alexis is

now ready to take the next step. She wants to take her business to the
next level, but she does not have enough money. So, what does Alexis
do? She would likely apply for a loan from a bank, offering the clean
deed of the land as collateral to secure the loan. This means that if
Alexis does not repay the bank the money she has borrowed (plus
interest) on schedule and thus defaults, then the bank can repossess
the land.'

Collateralized loans are far from a novel concept. One of the oldest
forms of secured money lending, via pawnbroker, dates back as far as
ancient China. 2 The concept of a collateralized loan is easily scalable.
Collateralized loans currently exist around the world, protecting many

lenders' abilities to take on large amounts of risk. Countries can also
3
acquire debt by taking loans from each other. However, the piper must
always receive his due.
A common path to modernization involving economic relief is one

country taking a monetary loan from another, more stable and
developed country. 4 Under the US Marshall Plan after World War II,
the United States gave monetary grants, food, and infrastructural aid
to western European countries in order to boost political stability and

postwar economic recovery. 5 Perhaps the most noteworthy modern

1.
3

See, e.g., Kimberly Cousino, Investment Banks Versus Commercial Banks, in

ECoNOMICS:

THE

DEFINITIVE

ENCYCLOPEDIA

FROM

THEORY

TO

PRACTICE:

MICROECONOMICS 232-33 (David A. Dieterle ed., 2017) (describing how banks secure
loans using collateral).
Zhou Liming, Yao Shujie, Wang Jinmin & Ou Jinghua, China'sPawnbroking
2.
Industry and the Puzzle of Losses during the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis, 15
CHINA

INT'L

J. 128, 129-30 (2017) (citing

Q. LIU,

THE HISTORY OF CHINA'S PAWN-

BROKING SYSTEM (1995) (Chinese)) (discussing the pawnbroking industry in China).
See, e.g., Jonathan Law, External Debt (Foreign Debt), in A DICTIONARY OF
3.
FINANCE AND BANKING (6th ed. 2018) (defining external or foreign debt as "[t]he
commitments of one government to other governments, banks, or to other financial
institutions abroad.").
See Melvyn P. Leffler, Divide and Invest: Why the Marshall Plan Worked, 97
4.
FOREIGN AFF. 170, 170 (2018) (giving an overview of the Marshall Plan). A notable
difference between the United States' Marshall Plan and China's Belt and Road
Initiative is that the Marshall Plan did not require countries to pay back the aid they
were given.

See, e.g., Marshall Auerback, China's Belt and Road Initiative: a Marshall
5.
Plan in Reverse, ALTERNET (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.alternet.org/2018/12/chinas-beltand-road-initiative-marshall-plan-reverse [https://perma.cc/E4SX-7PCM] (archived July
19, 2020) (giving an overview of the Belt and Road Initiative and comparing it to the
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example of this pattern is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI 6
is the People's Republic of China's endeavor to create a modern-day
version of the historic Silk Road by connecting countries across Eurasia

and Africa to promote economic ties and development. 7 The stage was
set by two of President Xi Jinping's speeches. In 2013, President Xi
Jinping proposed the concept of an economic version of the Silk Road

"[t]o forge closer economic ties, deepen cooperation and expand
development space in the Eurasian region." 8 Less than a month later,
Xi Jinping laid the groundwork for a maritime Silk Road when

addressing Indonesia's parliament regarding Chinese-Indonesian
relations and the success of joint maritime projects like the SurabayaMadura Bridge. 9

Marshall Plan). Although the Marshall Plan has been heavily criticized for its use of
policy entrepreneurship to promote democratic underpinnings, the United States'
actions are often acknowledged to have provided essential support for western Europe's
recuperation. E.g., SAM O'BRIEN, Questioning the Marshall Plan in the Buildup to the
Cold
War,
U.
N.H.
INQUIRY
J.
(Jennifer
Lee
ed.,
2014),
https://www.unh.edu/inquiryjournal/spring-2014/questioning-marshall-plan-buildup-

cold-war [https://perma.cc/F5T4-LEXZ] (archived July 19, 2020) ("Whatever conclusions
are drawn, it is impossible to overlook the fact that the aid provided by the Marshall
Plan rescued Europe from the edge of the abyss."); Leffler, supra note 4, at 170-74
(discussing the goals of the Marshall Plan); Daniel W. Drezner, This Time is Different,
FOREIGN AFF. (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/timedifferent [https://perma.cc/HZ99-M7MV] (archived July 19, 2020) ("Democracy was
spreading, liberating masses of people from tyranny.. .. The United States could take a
great deal of credit for these gains, because the liberal order it nurtured and expanded
had laid the foundations for decades of relative peace and prosperity.").
6.
E.g., Xie Tao, Is China's 'Belt and Road' a Strategy?, DIPLOMAT (Dec. 16,
2015),
https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/is-chinas-belt-and-road-a-strategy/
[https://perma.cc/3SMD-MG5Y] (archived July 19, 2020) (describing the BRI).
7.
The initiative is referred to as "Belt and Road" because of the intentions to (1)
use Central Asia to connect Chinese trade and production to Europe (the "belt") and (2)
expand Chinese maritime trade throughout Southeast Asia, Africa, and Europe (the
"road"). See The Belt andRoad InitiativeBackgrounder,INST. SEC. & DEV. POL'Y 1 (2016),
http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/20 16/10/2016-The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative.p df
fhttps://perma.cc/YD93-HYQF] (archived July 19, 2020). The adoption of the Belt and
Road Initiative is an interesting turn of events as it represents China's partial
acknowledgement of the political value and foreign policy pieces of its soft power. See
Fareed Zakaria, Why America Shouldn't PanicAbout Its Latest Challenger, 99 FOREIGN
AFF. 52, 60 (2020) ("Under Xi, China's foreign policy has ... [broken] with the country's
erstwhile passivity on the global stage, captured by the former Chinese leader Deng
Xiaoping's adage 'Hide your strength, bide your time."'); Joseph S. Nye, What Are the
Limits of China's Soft Power?, WORLD ECON.
F.
(July
10, 2015),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/07/what-are-the-limits-of-chinas-soft-power/

[https://perma.c/NG5Y-X6JB] (archived July 19, 2020) (describing how the growth of
Chinese soft power is limited by China's emphasis on nationalism and censorship of
society).
8.
Xi Jinping, President, People's Republic of China, Speech at Nazarbayev
University in Kazakhstan (Sept. 7, 2013).
9.
Xi Jinping, President, People's Republic of China, Remarks at APEC Summit
in Indonesia (Oct. 2, 2013).
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Over the years, Xi Jinping's vision has come to life via China's
national policy and events in foreign affairs, laying the groundwork for

these new silk roads through a collection of projects. Countries
typically use BRI loans to fund an array of infrastructure projects,
ranging from railways to energy development. From 2013 to mid-2018,

Oxford Economics reported that the total number of BRI projects in the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations member countries alone were
worth over $739.65 billion USD. 10 Since the BRI has been active in
Africa, the number of loans from China to African countries tripled
between 2012 and 2019.11 As of May 2019, the BRI has made inroads
into South America as China has signed BRI memoranda of
understanding (MOUs)1 2 with seven countries in the region, including

Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname, Ecuador, Bolivia, Uruguay, and
Chile.1 3
On its face, the BRI appears to be a very neighborly exercise of
policy entrepreneurship.

14

However, not everything is what it seems.

Within the last couple of years, China's systematic project has
garnered negative attention for exercising "debt-trap diplomacy"

1 5 Simply summarized, debt-trap
through its BRI projects in Africa.

Jinny Yan, The Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia, Appendix 1, in
INITIATIVE (BRI) AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 1, 8 (2018),
http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/reportsLSE-IDEAS-China-SEA-BRI.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PNZ8-MY6D] (archived July 19, 2020). The countries considered
include (in descending order of number of projects) Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia,
Malaysia, Singapore, Laos, Brunei, Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines.
Arwa Damon & Brent Swails, China and the United States Face Off in
11.
Djibouti as the World Powers Fight for Influence in Africa, CNN (May 27, 2019, 12:46
https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/26/africa/china-belt-road-initiative-djiboutiAM),
intl/index.html [https://perma.cc/K7EY-M36L] (archived July 19, 2020).
10.

CHINA'S

12.

BELT AND ROAD

The phrase "Memorandum of Understanding" is simply one of many terms

used for an agreement made between parties, who in this case are state governments.
"Memorandum of Understanding" has been used by many different States and
corporations. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding on the Creation of the Joint
Russ.
AFF.
FOREIGN
MINISTRY
2015,
10,
July
Website,
BRICS
https://www.mid.ruen/foreign-policy/news/[https://perma.cc/22B8-XPDB]
/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/1557373
(archived July 19, 2020); Memorandum of Understanding on Enhancing Cooperation in
Preventing and Combating Crime, Austl.-U.S., Nov. 16, 2011, U.S. DEP'T ST.
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/defaul/files/MOUUSAustralia.pdf
[https://perma.ec/Z2XY-YLBF] (archived July 19, 2020).
See Chris Devonshire-Ellis, China's Belt & Road Initiative and South
13.
America, SILK ROAD BRIEFING FROM DEZAN SHIRA & ASSOc. (May 29, 2019),
https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2019/05/29/chinas-belt-road-initiative-southamerica/ [https://perma.ccVCS8-4WFC] (archived July 19, 2020).
Policy entrepreneurship as a concept is largely undefined, though there is a
14.
basic shared understanding that it involves promotion of policy to effect change. See
David E. Pozen, We Are All Entrepreneurs Now, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 283, 300-03
(2008) (exploring the definition of policy entrepreneurship and its many glosses).
See, e.g., Marie Adele Carrai, China's Malleable Sovereignty Along the Belt
15.
and Road Initiative: The Case of the 99-Year Chinese Lease of Hambantota Port, 51
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diplomacy is an exercise of power in which a more economically
powerful country convinces a less powerful country to accept long-term
detrimental investment deals (that seem great in the short-term) and
then leverages the imbalance of power to "either acquire the project
altogether or to acquire political leverage in that country." 16 That
African countries would be willing to sign on to the BRI with a full
understanding of the potential consequences was, and remains,
unsurprising. In the case of Djibouti and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti
Railway, French and US officials have chided Djibouti for its growing

reliance on Chinese help, when the fact of the matter was simply that
Djibouti was in need of money and China was willing to lend it. 17 When
Djibouti defaulted on its Chinese loan, China happily collected on its
ninety-nine-year lease to build a Chinese military support base on
Djiboutian soil, seizing at this opportunity to join the world's other

N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1061, 1075-86 (2019) (explaining and criticizing China's use of
"debt-trap diplomacy" in the Hambantota Port).
16.
K. T. Ganeshalingam, China's Larger Geopolitical Strategy of the
Hambantota Port Project of Sri Lanka, 6 INT'L MULTIDISCIPLINARY RES. J. 2, 42-51
(2016).
17.
See Damon & Swails, supra note 11 (discussing China's activities in Djibouti);
Diane Desierto, China's 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative: Can a Bilaterally-Negotiated
'Globalization 2.0' Internalize Human Rights, Labor, and Environmental Standards?,
EJIL: TALK! BLOG EUR. J. INT'L L. (May 16, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/chinas-onebelt-one-road-initiative-can-a-bilaterally-negotiated-globalization-2-0-internalizehuman-rights-labor-and-environmental-standards/

[https://perma.cc/V87F-WCSP]

(archived July 19, 2020) ("[T]he lack of other truly competitive sources of foreign
financing is what ultimately reinforces China's monopolistic advantage over foreignfinancing of infrastructure and connectivity projects."); Nizar Manek, Djibouti Needed
Help, China Had Money, and Now the U.S. and FranceAre Worried, BLOOMBERG (Apr.
5, 2019, 11:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-04-06/djiboutineeded-help-china-had-money-and-now-the-u-s-and-france-are-worried

[https://perma.cc/T3DZ-EU5M] (archived July 19, 2020) (describing the geopolitical
tension stemming from China's lending to Djibouti); Todd Moss, Missing in Africa,
FOREIGN AFF. (Oct. 2, 2012), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2012-1002/missing-africa [https://perma.cc/RC46-GM2H] (archived July 19, 2020) ("[I]nstead of
lecturing African countries to beware, the administration should reflect upon why China
seems to be so attractive to the region as it gains self-confidence. Today's Africa does not

want charity. It seeks more investment and a measure of respect. China-bashing might
be good political theater, but it makes for ineffective policy."). Furthermore, countries
like the United States and France are no stranger to investing in Africa-according to
UNCTAD's World Investment Report 2019, France and the United States were among
the top five countries contributing to foreign direct investment in Africa in 2017. U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2019,
UNCTAD/WIR/2019 (June 12, 2019) [hereinafter UNCTAD Report 2019]. Notably,
however, the Brookings Institute reported that China's massive investment in Africa
accounted for 14 percent of sub-Saharan Africa's total debt stock, with the volume of
Chinese loans to Kenya measuring six times larger than those from its second-largest
creditor, France. Wenjie Chen & Roger Nord, China and Africa: Crouching Lion,
RetreatingDragon?, in FORESIGHT AFRICA: TOP PRIORITIES FOR THE CONTINENT IN 2018
102 (Brookings Inst. 2018).
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18
military powers in asserting control over a strategic region. Djibouti

is only one country on the list of African nations that many believe have
19
fallen victim to the BRI's predatory lending narrative.

The focus on this particular impact of the BRI, however, is too
narrow. Despite growing general concern about the implications of
20
China developing its soft power influence around the globe, there is

little academic scholarship examining the impacts of issues outside of
the BRI investment agreements' effects on arbitration and economic
relations. This Note seeks to grow this area of literature by evaluating
some of the available avenues for the international community to
address China's direct and indirect actions concerning the BRI.

Although no single action represents a significant threat to
international peace and security, each action is a drop in a bucket that
may not appear alarming until the bucket is almost full. China's
actions taken through and in support of the BRI are small steps taken
in the lengthy process of creating customary international human

rights law by establishing consistent state practices and laying the
foundations for a culture more accepting of China's view of economic
influence. 21 In the future, if these actions are successful, China would
have an even stronger anchoring tool in its toolbox to justify further

and deeper extensions of its power around the globe.
Much like the narrower example of the Marshall Plan, an
important caveat for these events is that this general practice-the use
of economic development programs to expand a state's global
influence-is not a new concept. Foreign affairs paradigms in trade

policy and the pursuit of hegemonic stability have appeared several
22
times throughout international history. In the twentieth century, the

See Damon & Swails, supra note 11 (discussing China's economic activity in
18.
Djibouti); Manek, supra note 17 (same).
See, e.g., LLOYD THRALL, CHINA'S EXPANDING AFRICAN RELATIONS:
19.
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 36-37 (2015) (mentioning several African

nations that have developed close ties with China in recent history); Pearl Risberg, The
Give-and-Take of BRI in Africa, 17 NEW PERSP. FOREIGN POL'Y 43, 43-44 (2019); Damon
& Swails, supra note 11; Ronak Gopaldas, Lessons from Sri Lanka on China's 'debt-trap
diplomacy', INST. FOR SEC. STUD., https://issafrica.org/amp/iss-today/lessons-from-srilanka-on-chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy (last visited Feb. 17, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ZJ93CQ56] (archived July 19, 2020) (noting that China has 39 African countries listed on the
official BRI website, and that lending from the Chinese government makes up 20% of
African governments' foreign debt).
See Damon & Swails, supra note 11 (acknowledging the potential implications
20.
for China's soft power from its dealings in Djibouti).
See Timothy Meyer, Codifying Custom, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 995, 1000 (2012)
21.
("[C]odification allows states to specify more precisely what customary international law
requires, thereby facilitating deeper cooperation and avoiding costly disputes over vague
legal rules."). For an explanation of customary international law, see discussion infra
Part III.B and accompanying notes.
See, e.g., JENNIFER M. HARRIS & ROBERT D. BLACKWILL, WAR BY OTHER
22.
MEANS: GEOECONOMICS AND STATECRAFT (2016) (exploring the use of economic

instruments, including those involving trade, as a vehicle for achieving geopolitical
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United States promoted the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
(GATT), and thus in a broad sense, promoted geopolitical objectives.23
Objectively, China's actions appear to seek the same greater goal.
What is troubling about China's execution of this strategy, however,
are the negative effects rippling out of China's chosen methods for
pursuing its own vision of the world.
Part II of this Note discusses the official policies of the BRI based
on policy documents and documents published from the Belt and Road
Forums hosted by China. This Part will also address the BRI's effects
on international human rights, international security, access to justice,

and the environment. This Note will not address economic concerns
outside of the functional usage of debt-trap diplomacy as an instrument

of a country's soft power influence, and this Note construes security
concerns broadly in reference to protection of nations and peoples. Part
III proceeds by examining how China is leveraging its position as a
member of the UN Human Rights Council and as a permanent member
of the UN Security Council to support actions under and surrounding
the BRI's win-win cooperation framework and China's greater vision of
increased global influence. This Part then highlights the reasons why
the lack of a unified negative international response to China's actions
is concerning. Finally, Part IV assesses ways in which other countries
can respond to China's efforts to grow its hegemonic power and

influence, as well as the challenges associated with each. Specifically,
this Note looks at ways for countries to respond through their foreign
affairs policies and as members of the UN.

goals); Patrick O'Brien & Geoffrey A. Pigman, Free trade, British hegemony and the
international economic order in the nineteenth century, 18 REV. INT'L STUD. 89, 95-97

(1992) (explaining how the liberalization of Britain's foreign trade policy in the
nineteenth century was the catalyst for the world economy's hegemonic stability in the
period that followed); see also G. John Ikenberry, Getting Hegemony Right, 63 NAT'L INT.
17 (2001) (examining US hegemony and what factors or actions may contribute to its
increasing or decreasing).

23.
Agreements, including those in trade, can be used to promote geopolitical
objectives. See, e.g., Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, Trade and the Separation of
Powers, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 583, 597-99 (2019). As Professors Meyer and Sitaraman
explain,
Trade is also a tool for advancing geopolitical goals; trade
agreements can be used to benefit allies, reward countries who follow
American leadership, or sanction those who pursue actions opposed
to US foreign policy objectives. Finally, trade agreements are a way
for the United States to exercise international leadership;
agreements can set the "rules of the road" for countries around the

globe to follow.
Id. (internal footnotes omitted). However, the GATT functioned very differently
from the Marshall Plan and the Belt and Road Initiative in that it used market access
to promote geopolitical objectives, rather than development aid. Thus, this example
simply highlights a higher level of similarity between the three policies as forms of
geoeconomics.
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II. WELCOME TO THE BELT AND ROAD

The BRI evolved

significantly over the past few years. The

international community originally referred to the BRI as "One Belt,

One Road," based on the English translation of the initiative's Chinese
name "Yi Dai, Yi Lu." 24 In 2015, the Chinese government released
guidance that standardized the initiative's name to its current name,
and Road Initiative."25 The 2015 action plan focused on the goal

"Belt

of increasing global connectivity.

26

The Chinese government averred

that the slow recovery of the global economy from the 2008-09
recession evidenced the need for China to promote the original Silk

Road's spirit of "peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness,
27
[and] mutual learning and mutual benefit." This idea is consistent

throughout many of the documents published by the government on
the BRI. Though not all stakeholders in BRI projects will be Chinese,
a basic assumption of the entire BRI policy is that public and private
Chinese corporations will play a central role in the planning and

implementation of these projects. 28 Such is a logical component of an
entrepreneurial policy. But China went a step further and even
founded its own international financial institution, the Asian
InfrastructureInvestment Bank, to better support development efforts

in other states. 29 This Note examines whether the BRI is actually the

E.g., The Belt and Road Initiative Backgrounder, supra note 7.
24.
25.
E.g., Tao, supra note 6.
See State Council of the People's Republic of China, Full text: Action Plan on
26.
the Belt and Road Initiative, ENGLISH.GOV.CN (Mar. 30, 2015, 7:31 PM),
2 9 35
7
8
14 5080 4 0 .h
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_2
tm [https://perma.cc/RQ3S-D9S9] (archived July 19, 2020).
27.

See id.

Patrick M. Norton, Challenges for Arbitration in Asia, 13 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.
28.
72, 77-78 (2018).
Jane Perlez, China Creates a World Bank of Its Own, and the U.S. Balks, N.Y.
29.
TIMES (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/business/international/china-

fhttps://perma.cc/9RWH-BHRC]
creates-an-asian-bank-as-the-us-stands-aloof.html
(archived July 19, 2020) ("The United States worries that China will use the bank to set
the global economic agenda on its own terms, forgoing the environmental protections,
human rights, anticorruption measures and other governance standards long promoted
by its Western counterparts. American officials point to China's existing record of loans
to unstable governments,

construction deals

for unnecessary

infrastructure, and

villagers abruptly uprooted with little compensation."); accord David Dollar, Opinion,
Belt,
One
Road',
BROOKINGS,
AIIB
and
the
'One
The
(last visited
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-aiib-and-the-one-belt-one-road/
Aug.23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/HP6T-FUPD] (archived Aug. 23, 2020) ("Some of the
impetus for China to launch the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was

Beijing's concern that the governance structure of existing International Financial
Institutions (IFIs) was evolving too slowly."); Elliot Wilson, Asia: Could Covid-19 be the
22,
2020),
(Apr.
EUROMONEY
of
AIIB?,
making
https://www.euromoney.com/article/b1191yrb8ztsqc/asia-could-covid-19-be-the-makingof-the-aiib [https://perma.cc/78CS-6KA4 (archived July 19, 2020) ('The idea was to
create a bank that would help Asian countries but also boost global connectivity and
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embodiment of neighborly spirit or if it is instead a guise for expanding

Chinese influence and gaining strategic advantages. 30
A. The Mechanics of the Belt and Road
The development and execution of BRI partnerships is very
methodical. These partnerships often begin through a process of
diplomatic visits followed by written agreements. 31 After China and
the loan-receiving country have decided to undergo a BRI project, they
sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU). 32 Notably, the Chinese
government does not have a published, official list of all countries with

which it has signed MOUs. 33 All published versions of MOUs found in
the course of researching for this Note were obtained through the
websites of the other signing government or on third-party sites. 3 4
After an MOU is signed, the countries get to work.

trade.'... 'It was set up as a multilateral for infrastructure financing,' he says. 'It is not a
development bank in the strict sense of the word."').
30.
See Peter K. Yu, BuildingIntellectual Property InfrastructureAlong China's
Belt and Road, 14 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 275, 323 ("[C]ommentators remain divided over
the BRI's overall benefits, potential drawbacks, and future impacts."); Zakaria, supra
note 7, at 63 ("China hardly qualifies as a mortal danger to [the U.S.'s] imperfect order.").
31.
For example, President Xi Jinping's visits to Senegal and Portugal led to
quick announcements of a new partnership under the BRI. See Deng Xiaoci, China,
Senegal Sign Belt and Road Cooperation Document, GLOBAL TIMES (July 22, 2018),
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1111845.shtml
[https://perma.cc/D2HU-75JU]
(archived July 19, 2020); Liu Zhen, Portugal signs agreement with China on Belt and
Road
Initiative,
SOUTH
CHINA
MORNING
POST
(Dec.
5,
2018),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2176560/portugal-wavers-xijinping-presses-europe-belt-and-road [https://perma.cc/T27P-NAV5] (archived July 19,
2020).
32.
E.g., Cooperation agreements and MOUs under the Belt and Road Initiative,
BELT

&

ROAD

INITIATIVE,

https://www.beltroad-initiative.com/memorundum-of-

understanding-belt-and-road-initiative/
(last
visited
Sept.
20,
2019)
[https://perma.cc/ACR6-TE2W] (archived July 20, 2020).
33.
See id. ("There is no official list or comprehensive compilation on which
countries or organizations already have signed BRI-MoUs with China.")
34.
See Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation Within the Framework
of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Initiative, China-Vic.,
Austl., Oct. 8, 2018, https://www.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-02/Belt-and-RoadInitiative-MOU.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2ZL-LAEF] (archived July 20, 2020) [hereinafter
China-Australia MOU]; Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation Within the
Framework of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road
Initiative,
Bosn.
&
Herz.-China,
May
14,
2017,
http://www.mvteo.gov.ba/attachments/en-bh---pr-china-mou-silk-road-economicbeltpdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/KS2G-LKX3] (archived July 20, 2020) [hereinafter ChinaBosnia and Herzegovina MOU]; Joint Statement to Develop Cooperation in Third-Party
Markets,
Can.-China,
Sept.
24,
2016,
23-24,
https://ccbc.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/CCBC_Belt-and-Road.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6G4M-VYR5]
(archived July 20, 2020) [hereinafter China-Canada MOU]; Memorandum of
Understanding on Cooperation Within the Framework of the Silk Road Economic Belt
and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative, China-Cook Islands, July 23, 2018,
http://www.mfem.gov.ck/images/Development/CookIslands-
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35
Latvia, the first Baltic state to sign on to the BRI, signed an
MOU containing language that the "MOU does not constitute legally

binding obligations for the two Participants. It is only an expression of
36
their common will to jointly advance the Belt and Road Initiative."
37
Such language is common among BRI MOUs. Though this language
disclaims that the MOUs are not legally binding, some clauses contain

language referencing other bilateral and multilateral agreements that
are legally binding, invoking secondary legal obligations. For example,
the China-Latvia MOU includes a clause stating that "[t]he two
Participants will make full use of existing bilateral treaties and

intergovernmental mechanisms to jointly promote the Belt and Road
Initiative, explore new opportunities for bilateral cooperation, and

38
coordinate on major issues concerning bilateral cooperation." But is
such a clause actionable? The inclusion of both seemingly binding and
nonbinding language ultimately raises two concerns related to
actionability: first, whether MOUs are treaties under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), and second, the function of

the invoked secondary legal obligations.
The first concern spurred by the conflicting language is whether
an MOU is a treaty within the meaning of the VCLT. The drafters of

[https://perma.cc/T54ZPRCBelt_and_RoadMOU._signed_12_November_2018.pdf
EXB3] (archived July 20, 2020) [hereinafter China-Cook Islands MOU]; Plin bilaterilni
spoluprice mezi vladou C'esk6 republiky a vlidou Cinsk6 lidov6 republiky v rimci
iniciativy Pismo a Stezka [Plan for bilateral cooperation between the Government of the
Czech Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China within the
Nov.
5, 2016,
Czech-China,
Framework of the Silk Road initiative],
https://www.vlada.cz/assets/media-centrumlaktualne/Plan-bilateralni-spoluprace-mezi-

vladou-Ceske-republiky-a-vladou-Cinske-lidove-republiky-v-ra

mi-iniciativy-Pasmo-aStezka.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL5E-CZJH] (archived July 20, 2020) (in Czech)
[hereinafter China-Czech Republic MOU]; Memorandum of Understanding on
Cooperation Within the Framework of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century
2019,
Mar.
Initiative,
China-It,
Road
Silk
Maritime
http://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/Memorandum_Italia-Cina_EN.pdf
ihttps://perma.cc/H9Q7-AGFZ] (archived July 20, 2020) [hereinafter China-Italy MOU];
Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation Within the Framework of the Silk Road
Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative, China-Lat., Nov.
http://tap.mk.gov.lv/doc/2016_11/AM_MoUEN_20161024.2386.docx
2016,
{https://perma.cc/KV6K-S4ZN] (archived July 20, 2020) [hereinafter China-Latvia
MOU].
See Hu Yongqui & Wang Qing Yun, Latvia Becomes First to Link with Belt
35.
and Road Initiative in Baltic Sea Area, CHINA DAILY EUR. (Apr. 11, 2016, 10:39 PM),
http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-11/04/content_27280715.htm
[https://perma.cc/5S5P-AMEM] (archived July 20, 2020).
See China-Latvia MOU, supra note 34, pt. V.
36.
See Chris Devonshire-Ellis, Vassal States? Understanding China's Belt and
37.
Road MoU, SILK ROAD BRIEFING FROM DEVAN SHIRA & Assoc. (Feb.

8, 2018),

https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2018/02/08/vassal-states-understanding-chinasbelt-road-mou/_[https://perma.ccWE34-F6GZ] (archived July 20, 2020) (explaining some
commonalities between China's MOUs with other countries).
See China-Latvia MOU, supra note 34, pt. IV.
38.
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the VCLT did not include the creation of binding obligations in the
actual definition of "treaty,"39 however, a separate provision states that
"[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties." 40 Under the VCLT,

parties to a treaty also have an obligation to maintain the object and
purpose of their agreements. 4 ' Thus, whether an MOU is a treaty
within the scope of the VCLT is significant to whether the VCLT is a

potential mechanism for enforcing MOU obligations, despite its own
nonbinding disclaimer.
The second concern is the nature of the secondary legal obligations
created through MOUs. The broad wording of the China-Latvia MOU
demonstrates this well-the document itself does not explain what
making "full use" of existing treaties and mechanisms to promote the

BRI and other bilateral cooperation looks like. 42 This attempt to create
secondary obligations ultimately makes it more difficult to discern

what actions state parties are obligated to take. If parties do not
understand what their obligations are, there is a risk that a party will
unknowingly breach the agreement and thereby subject themselves to
some sort of punishment. The underlying assumption here, however,

is that such a breach would be actionable to bring about the
punishment.

Actionability concerns hold an extra nuance here because an
agreement's enforceability influences how contract partners view their
own obligations under the agreement. 43 If one partner thinks that the
penalties for breaching the contract will not be enforced, the incentives

to uphold its obligations decrease. Because of the grey area of
enforceability, China is able to exercise indirect influence over its
partners by saying that MOUs are nonbinding while simultaneously
attaching them to other legally binding agreements through the
quotation of existing and legally binding bilateral investment treaties

39.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 1(a), Jan. 27, 1980, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
40.
See id. art. 26.
41.
The VCLT's consistent reference in several provisions to the maintenance of
a treaty's original object and purpose support that it is an important element of
consideration when analysing treaty obligations. See id. arts. 18-20, 31, 33, 41, 58. This
concept is mirrored in other conventions as well. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on

Succession of States in respect of Treaties arts. 15, 17-19, 27, 30-37, Nov. 6, 1996, 1946
U.N.T.S. 3, 17 I.L.M. 1488.
42.
See China-Latvia MOU, supra note 34, pt. IV.
43.
International contracting parties' views of their own obligations can shift
based on what consequences they will face if the agreement's terms are violated. Unlike
in the domestic context, the international contracts realm maintains very different
consequences for contractual violations. Professors Guzman and Meyer explain that
"[m]oney damages are rarely paid from one party to the other in response to a violation.
In fact, violations are often not compensated through any direct mechanism. In those
instances where some compensation exists, it is almost never a zero-sum transfer

comparable to money damages." Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International
Soft Law, J. LEGAL ANALYSIS, 171, 192-93 (2010).
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and other trade agreements.4 4 Such interpretative methods thus
demonstrate China's desire to exercise influence over its partners
indirectly. 45
46
examined
International law practitioner Chris Devonshire-Ellis
several MOUs signed between China and BRI partners. His study
identified that clauses regarding implied support for both Chineseowned and Chinese government-funded bodies show that where

provisions favor a single

country's unilateral preference,

such

provisions tend to benefit China and Chinese institutions rather than
47
It is natural and unsurprising that a
the other party signatory.

country would want to negotiate more favorable terms for itself in an
international agreement. The magnitude of the result of these Chinafriendly provisions, however, seems alarming. As referenced in the
Introduction and expounded upon in the following Part, China has

managed to obtain formidable collateral (like a ninety-nine-year lease
to build a military base) from its partners, while other loans, such as

those for resource-development infrastructure, have been tied to rights
for a share of resource production.48 China is not alone in its
49
infrastructural- and resource-investment efforts in African countries;

it is the extent of these agreements that is cause for concern. For
example, the loans for resource-development projects are often
resource-backed loans, meaning the loan is guaranteed by, and
50
repayment includes, a share of the resource production.
Furthermore, such loans typically include agreements to contract all

See Devonshire-Ellis, supra note 37.
44.
See id.
45.
SHIRA
&
ASsoc.,
See
Chris
Devonshire-Ellis,
DEZAN
46.
https://www.dezshira.com/personnel/chris-devonshire-ellis.html
(last visited Feb. 19,
(archived July 20, 2020) (producing Mr.
2020) [https://perma.cc/AR35-2HDU]
Devonshire-Ellis's biography).
See Devonshire-Ellis, supra note 37.
47.
See THRALL, supra note 19, at 41-42 (discussing loans with rights to resources
48.
as collateral); Damon & Swails, supra note 11 (noting that Sri Lanka gave China a 99year lease to the Hambantota Port after Sri Lanka defaulted on its loan); Manek, supra
note 17.
According to UNCTAD's World Investment Report 2019: Special Economic
49.
Zones, the top five countries contributing to foreign direct investment in Africa in 2017
were France, the Netherlands, the United States, the United Kingdom, and China. See
UNCTAD Report 2019, supra note 17, at 34 (displaying data on foreign investor
economies in Africa).
See THRALL, supra note 19, at 41-42 (giving an overview of resource-backed
50.
loans and how China uses them); Brahma Chellaney, China's Debt-Trap Diplomacy,
PROJECT

SYNDICATE

(Jan.

23,

2017),

https://www.project-

syndicate.org/commentary/china-one-belt-one-road-loans-debt-by-brahma-chellaney2017-01 [https://perma.ccYP2L-YWRK] (archived July 20, 2020) ("[T]he projects that
China is supporting are often intended. . .to facilitate Chinese access to natural
resources, or to open the market for its low-cost and shoddy export goods. In many cases,
China even sends its own construction workers, minimizing the number of local jobs that
are created.").
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or part of the project with Chinese firms and to use Chinese firms to
source materials and labor. 51
The typical result of China's MOU structure is an asymmetric
legal relationship between one politically and economically weak

nation and a more dominant one. Such a relationship leads to the
negative effects discussed in the following Part.

B. The (Negative) Effects of the Belt and Road Initiative
The BRI leaves quite a wake in its path. Though the BRI has been

successful in many of its infrastructural projects, these projects have
high costs extending past just the economic ones. This Part gives a brief
overview of areas of concern resulting from some of China's
partnerships under the banner of the BRI, including human rights
abuses, international security threats, potentially obstructed access to
justice, and detrimental environmental impacts.
1. Human Rights Abuses
A significant concern arising out of the BRI is the exportation of
human rights abuses. One of the clearest examples is in Xinjiang,
Kazakhstan. Since the 2013 announcement that laid the groundwork
for the BRI, the Xinjiang authorities have been implementing
"reeducation" programs and anti-Islamic programming targeted
against minority groups like Xinjiang's Turkic-speaking Muslims, the
Uighurs, with support from the Chinese government.5 2 Xinjiang is a
key element for the BRI because it historically served as a point of
entry to Eurasia. 53 Some experts like Sean Roberts suggest that
Xinjiang's geopolitical position is a strong motive for China to seek and
maintain control in the region. 54 As Roberts explains:
The intention to make Xinjiang a central part of BRI created a new urgency in
the CCP to prevent further Uighur dissent in the region. In many ways, what we

51.
See THRALL, supra note 19, at 41-42.
52.
See Hilary Hurd, China'sHuman Rights Abuses Against Uighursin Xinjiang,
LAWFARE (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinas-human-rights-abusesagainst-uighurs-xinjiang# [https://perma.cc/92TZ-KREK] (archived July 20, 2020).
53.
E.g., Shabir Hashmi, Xinjiang at the heart of Belt, Road, CHINA DAILY (Sept.
2,
2019),
http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201909/02/WS5d6c84d0a310cf3e355692ce.html
[https://perma.cc/GUR3-DQTA] (archived July 20, 2020) ("Historically, Xinjiang has
been the center of economic activities and the hub of connectivity between China,
Afghanistan, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Pakistan. In the past, 80
percent of Chinese trade was done through Xinjiang.").
54.
Asim Kashgarian & Rikar Hussein, China's Plan in Xinjiang Seen as Key
Factor
in
Uighur
Crackdown,
VOICE
AM.
(Dec.
22,
2019),
https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/chinas-plan-xinjiang-seen-key-factor-

uighur-crackdown_[https://perma.cc/Z48H-URAS]

(archived July 20, 2020).
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are seeing today is an attempt to entirely eliminate any possible Uighur dissent
55
to the transformation of their homeland that the BRI will inevitably facilitate.

Leaked Chinese government documents, satellite images, and
former detainees are evidence that these camps exist and continue to
violate Uighur citizens' human rights, despite many Chinese officials
maintaining that these camps are just schools to "combat 'terrorism
56
and religious extremism"' and "fake news." But technology's role with
regard to Uighur imprisonment does not start and end there. In July

2020, researchers at a mobile security firm found that Chinese efforts
to hack and track Uighurs extended back to 2013.67 "The timeline
suggests the hacking campaign was an early cornerstone in China's
Uighur surveillance efforts that would later extend to collecting blood

samples, voice prints, facial scans, and other personal data to

5
transform Xinjiang into a virtual police state." 8
China is not the only country seeking to use technology to control

people. China has also been selling its surveillance technology to Belt
59
and Road partners who are using-and abusing-these systems. But
China is not just providing other countries with technology; it is also
promoting digital authoritarianism by educating governments on how
60
A 2018 study on digital
to monitor and influence their people.
countries (including BRI
eighteen
authoritarianism found that at least
using Chinesereportedly
were
Venezuela)
partners like Rwanda and

made surveillance systems and at least thirty-eight countries had

55.

Id.
BBC,
Camps,
Hidden
China's
Sudworth,
John
56.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-sh/China hidden_camps (last visited May 30,
2020) [https://perma.cc/S9XD-4UL5] (archived July 20, 2020); Ivan Watson & Ben
Westcott, China's Xinjiang's Camps: Leaked Chinese Government Records Reveal
Detailed Surveillance Reports on Uyghur Families and Beijing's Justification for Mass
Detentions, CNN (Feb. 2020), https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2020/02/asia/xinjiangchina-karakax-document-intl-hnk/ [https://perma.cc/PW25-S7HS] (archived July 20,
2020).
See Paul Mozur & Nicole Perlroth, China's Software Stalked Uighurs Earlier
57.
2020),
1,
TIMES
(July
N.Y.
Learn,
Researchers
Widely,
and More
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/technology/china-uighurs-hackers-malwarehackers-smartphones.html [https://perma.cc/X2HL-6WT5] (archived July 20, 2020).
Id. The Chinese government's desire to track and control Uighurs is
58.
highlighted by the fact that the malware was not limited to targeting those who stayed
in China, but also those who chose to flee. See id.
Paul Mozur, Jonah M. Kessel & Melissa Chan, Made in China, Exported to
59.
2019),
(Apr.
24,
N.Y.
TIMES
Surveillance
State,
World:
The
the
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/technology/ecuador-surveillance-cameras-policegovernment.html_[https://perma.cc/V8LB-H4A5] (archived July 20, 2020).
As Shahbaz explains, "Digital authoritarianism is being promoted as a way
60.
for governments to control their citizens through technology, inverting the concept of the
internet as an engine of human liberation." ADRIAN SHAHBAZ, THE RISE OF DIGITAL
2018),
ed.,
Roylance
(Tyler
2
AUTHORITARIANISM

https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/10192018_FINALFOTN_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6464-HAFS] (archived July 20, 2020).
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telecom
infrastructure
installed
by
Chinese
companies. 6 1
Furthermore, at least thirty-six countries have received instruction on
topics supporting the Chinese vision of media, including censorship
recharacterized as public opinion guidance. 62 There is a significant

lack of transparency in the content of these training seminars, but the
effects have been very public. One year after Vietnamese officials
received training on cybersecurity from China in April 2017, Vietnam
introduced its own cybersecurity law that closely mirrored that of

China. 63 Moreover, "[i]ncreased activity by Chinese companies and
officials in Africa similarly preceded the passage of restrictive
cybercrime and media laws in Uganda and Tanzania over the past
year." 64 By selling this technology and educating other nations on its
own practices, China is reinforcing and spreading the ability for

governments to perpetrate human rights abuses in the technological
age.
China is currently party to many international conventions on
human rights, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, ratified by China in 1980);
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ratified by China in 1981); the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT, ratified by China in 1988); the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, signed in 1967 but still
not ratified by China); and the International Covenant on Economic,

Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, ratified by China in 2001).65

61.
Id. at 9-10. Note that while not all of the firms assisting these nations are
state-owned enterprises, private Chinese firms are still "beholden to the government and
its strategic goals." Id. Part of the significance of Chinese company involvement in the
telecom infrastructure of other countries is that "[a]s more of the world's critical
telecommunications infrastructure is built by China, global data may become more
accessible to Chinese intelligence agencies." Id. at 11.
62.
Id. at 9; see also Mozur, Kessel & Chan, supra note 59 (describing "public
opinion guidance" as a euphemism for censorship). Consider also that creating such
relationships with technology has allowed China to further grow its BRI influenceChina and Myanmar were not BRI partners at the time of Shahbaz's survey, but the
countries finally inked some BRI agreements earlier this year. See John Reed, China
and Myanmar Sign Off on Belt and Road Projects, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/a5265114-39d1- 1 lea-aOla-bae547046735
[https://perma.cc/B9JQ-LK5J] (archived Sept. 28, 2020).
63.
SHAHBAZ, supra note 60, at 9.
64.
Id.
65.
See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR];
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S.
195; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or

Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]. It is also interesting to
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Supporting such detention and reeducation programs, while spreading

those international
likely violates
authoritarian principles,
agreements. 66 Some scholars, like Margaret Lewis, argue that the
international community needs to expressly renounce China's human
rights violations and protect the integrity of human rights agreements;

Lewis specifically calls for China to remove its signature from the
ICCPR.67 This particular view may raise the concerns that such actions
would isolate China further and that a response from the UN Human
Rights Council would serve as a better deterrent. As later discussed in
Part III of this Note, such a response is highly unlikely given China's
68
position on the council.

Furthermore, as BRI projects are implemented, adequate analysis
69
of the impact of these projects on human rights issues is lacking.

Human Rights Watch suggests that the Chinese government enables
meaningful consultations with groups affected by BRI projects to allow

70
them to express their concerns openly and safely. Both the lack of
disclosure of projects' anticipated social and environmental impacts

and the lack of consultation with affected communities "are
inconsistent with basic obligations of states under international
human rights law."7 1 Human rights issues connected to BRI projects

have also arisen and yet been ignored in Pakistan, Myanmar, and Sri
Lanka.72

note that of the examples of Memorandums of Understanding found in the process of
researching for this Note (Latvia, Italy, Australia, Cook Islands, Czech Republic,
Canada, and Bosnia and Herzegovina), none have made references to any of these human
rights treaties, let alone affirming future support for protection of human rights in future
projects. See China-Australia MOU, supra note 34; China-Bosnia and Herzegovina
MOU, supra note 34; China-Canada MOU, supra note 34; China-Cook Islands MOU,
supra note 34; China-Czech Republic MOU, supra note 34; China-Italy MOU, supra note
34; China-Latvia MOU, supra note 34.
See Hurd, supra note 52 (discussing China's human rights abuses and their
66.
relation to international human rights law).
67.

Margaret K. Lewis, Why China Should Unsign the International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights, 53 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 131, 132 (2020); see also Annie
Hsu, Should China Unsign the the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights?,
PENN

ARTS

&

SCI.

CTR.

FOR

STUD.

CoNTEMP.

CHINA

(Sept.

30,

2019),

https://cscc.sas.upenn.edu/node/3578 [https://perma.cd/H2KZ-ESUW] (archived July 20,
2020) (discussing Professor Lewis's argument that China should unsign the ICCPR).
See discussion infra Part III.A.1 and accompanying notes.
68.
China: 'Belt and Road' Projects Should Respect Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH
69.
(Apr. 21, 2019, 8:00 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/21/china-belt-and-roadprojects-should-respect-rights [hereinafter China: "Belt and Road" Projects].
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
See, e.g., id. (discussing some of the human rights concerns arising from
72.
China's BRI activities in these countries).
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2. International Security Threats
The United States' international security concerns are everincreasing as Russia and China work to expand their unilateral
influence around the world through military advancements and
relationship building. 73 Over the last three decades, Africa has become
one of the fastest-growing regions of the world. 74 But this growth has
been neither easy nor consistent. Strong but volatile economic growth
has failed to translate into either effective alleviation of poverty or
progressive decreases in the rate of vulnerable employment. 75 This has
rendered African nations susceptible, some argue, to debt-trap
diplomacy. 76 Part I of this Note introduced the example from Djibouti.
In 2017, China opened its first overseas military base in the Republic
of Djibouti with a ninety-nine-year lease after Djibouti defaulted on its

loan. 77 The significance of this port is underscored by Djibouti's

73.
See, e.g., Linus Unah, Is the US Making Moves to Counter Chinese and
Russian
Influence
in
Africa?,
TRT
WORLD
(Jan.
10,
2019),
https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/is-the-us-making-moves-to-counter-chinese-andrussian-influence-in-africa-23242 [https://perma.cc/L9CR-T3U4] (archived July 20,
2020). For information on the international arms sales portion of the Belt and Road
Initiative, see James Daniel, China's One Belt, One Road Initiative and Its International
Arms Sales, Sept.-Oct. 2019 MIL. REV. 96.
74.
See generally AFRICAN UNION COMM'N OF THE ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION
AND DEV., AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT AND DYNAMICS: GROWTH, JOBS AND INEQUALITIES

(2018) (reporting research on economic development across the African Union).
75.
See id. at 34-35. The International Labour Organization defines workers in
vulnerable employment "as the sum of own-account workers and contributing family
workers. They are less likely to have formal work arrangements, and are therefore more
likely to lack decent working conditions, adequate social security and 'voice' through
effective representation by trade unions and similar organizations. Vulnerable
employment is often characterized by inadequate earnings, low productivity and difficult
conditions of work that undermine workers' fundamental rights." Int'l Labour Org.
[ILO], Vulnerable Employment and Poverty on the Rise, Interview with ILO Chief of
Employment Trends Unit, (Jan. 26, 2010), https://www.ilo.org/global/about-theilo/newsroom/features/WCMS_120470/lang--en/index.htm [permalink].
76.
See Chellaney, supra note 50 ("[T]he projects that China is supporting are
often intended not to support the local economy, but to facilitate Chinese access to
natural resources, or to open the market for its low-cost and shoddy export goods. In
many cases, China even sends its own construction workers, minimizing the number of

local jobs that are created."). Compare Mark Green, China's Debt Diplomacy, FOREIGN
POL'Y (Apr. 25, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/25/chinas-debt-diplomacy/
fhttps://perma.cc/PU6E-NZHB] (archived July 20, 2020) (describing how China's
practices have derailed developing nations' progress towards sustainable financial
management), with Ben Doherty, Experts Dispel Claims of China Debt-Trap Diplomacy
in
Pacific
but
Risks
Remain,
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
20,
2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/21/chinese-loans-expose-pacific-islands-torisk-of-unsustainable-debt-report-finds [https://perma.cc/WHU2-25XV] (archived Aug.
23, 2020) ("China has not engaged in deliberate "debt-trap diplomacy" in the Pacific,
[though] the burgeoning scale of China's lending, and institutional weakness within
Pacific states, pose clear risks for small states being overwhelmed by debt....").
77.
Damon & Swails, supra note 11; see also supra notes 15-20 and accompanying
text.
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geographic location and the fact that the port is only fifteen minutes
78
away from an American base. Djibouti is not only host to the United

States and China, but also Spain, France, Japan, Italy, and soon Saudi
Arabia.79 International security, however, is not limited to military
matters.
Developments on the Digital Silk Road underscore further
80
The
concerns regarding the BRI as a threat to political freedom.

Digital Silk Road is a subproject of the BRI, focusing specifically on
81
building internet infrastructure. June Teufel Dreyer, a Senior Fellow
in the Asia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, raised

concerns about the partnership between Venezuelan President Nicolas
Maduro's government with Chinese telecommunications company ZTE
to develop a carnet de la patria system. 82 Such a system would create
a national database tracking citizens' payments for medicine, pensions,

and food.

83

Chinese

government

That ZTE is a state-owned enterprise means that the
implicitly

approves

of President Maduro's

surveillance of the Venezuelan people. This technology, Dreyer puts
forth, is an infringement of privacy and will "enable the government to

84
keep track of dissidents and quash dissenting views." Thus, the

security issues extending from Belt and Road projects are particularly
relevant for both states and individuals.
Others point out that these types of developments may give China
the leverage to push countries towards more authoritarian political

systems. 85 Tin Hinane El Kadi, Associate Fellow at Chatham House,

See Damon & Swails, supra note 11.
78.
See Manek, supra note 17 ("China is hardly the only country with a military
79.
presence in Djibouti. The U.S. Africa Command is headquartered at Camp Lemonnier,
a naval expeditionary facility that's the only permanent American base in Africa. The
Japanese, Italians, and Spanish are also here. The Saudis are planning a base. France
has had a foothold since at least 1894; what is now Djibouti was French Somaliland, a
colony, until 1977.").
See Stewart M. Patrick & Ashley Feng, Belt and Router: China Aims for
80.
Tighter Internet Controls with Digital Silk Road, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.:
INTERNATIONALIST (July 2, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/blogfbelt-and-router-china-aims-

&

tighter-internet-controls-digital-silk-road_[https://perma.c/EEE8-4RTM] (archived July
20, 2020) (discussing the implications of China's plans for the "Digital Silk Road").
See Hong Shen, Building a Digital Silk Road? Situating the Internet in
81.
China's Belt and Road Initiative, 12 INT'L J. COMM. 2683, 2683-2684 (2018); Patrick
Feng, supra note 80.
June Teufel Dreyer, The Belt, The Road, and Latin America, FOREIGN POL'Y
82.
RES. INST. (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/01/the-belt-the-road-andlatin-america/_[https://perma.cc/HWM5-ABUC] (archived July 20, 2020).
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
See Chris Conrad, China's Belt and Road Initiative: Boon for Growth or
85.
5:13 PM),
2019,
INDEP.
BLOG (July 18,
Threat to
Civil Liberties?,
https:/Iblog.independent.org/2019/07/18/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-boon-for4
growth-or-threat-to-civil-liberties/_[https://perma.cc/FR7D-6 XK] (archived July 20,
2020).
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points out that these developing relationships and technologies lend
themselves well to China's growing ability to shape the world of

cyberspace governance. 86 Similar to the discussion of surveillance
technology in the previous subpart on human rights abuses, the fact
that more and more governments are now looking to China for

guidance on how to grow is concerning. 87 "If democracies fail to
advance their own principles and interests with equal determination,
digital authoritarianism will become an inescapable reality almost by
default." 88

Considering

the

UN passed

the UN

Charter

to protect

international peace and security, 89 the security issues stemming from

China's actions in BRI partner countries should be garnering a strong
response from the international community. Part III.B explores this

issue further.
3. Potentially Obstructed Access to Justice
Access to justice through adjudication of BRI-related disputes is a
growing cause of concern for the international community. Due to the
disputes naturally arising from such a large undertaking, China

established the Chinese International Commercial Courts (CICC) in
Xian and Shenzhen. 90 The CICC is an outgrowth of the Chinese court
system; therefore,

unlike other international courts,

the current

collection of judges are all Chinese nationals serving as judges of the
Supreme People's Court of China.9 1 Generally speaking, jurisdiction

can be conferred in agreements; for example, the agreement terms
regarding the construction of the Montenegro highway to connect the
Adriatic coast to Montenegro's landlocked neighbor Serbia indicate
that any legal issues arising under the project fall within the

86.

Tin Hinane El Kadi, The Promise and Perilof the DigitalSilk Road, CHATHAM

HOUSE (June 6, 2019), https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/promise-and-

peril-digital-silk-road_[https://perma.cc/7J2U-Z8DA] (archived July 20, 2020). The Xian
court will handle cases relating to the land "Belt" while the Shenzen court will handle
disputes arising along the maritime "Road." See Jonathan E. Hillman & Matthew P.
Goodman, All Rise? Belt and Road Court is in Session, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD.
(July 26,
2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/all-rise-belt-and-road-court-session
[https://perma.cc/Q2YT-95GA] (archived July 20, 2020).
87.
See supranotes 59-63 and accompanying text.
88.

SHAHBAZ, supra note 60, at 11.

89.
U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1 ("The Purposes of the United Nations are: To
maintain international peace and security. . ..").
90.
See Nicholas Lingard, John Choong, Robert Kirkness, Kate Apostolova & Xin
Liu, China Establishes International Commercial Courts to Handle Belt and Road
InitiativeDisputes, FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, LLP, reposted on OXFORD BUs.
L. BLOG (Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2018/08/chinaestablishes-international-commercial-courts-handle-belt-and
[https://perma.cc/PEC48D2X] (archived July 20, 2020).
91.
See id. (describing the main functions and features of the CICC).
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92
jurisdiction of these Chinese arbitration courts. However, the CICC
93
has several prerequisites to accept cases.

Furthermore, proceedings must be conducted in Mandarin and
parties to a dispute may only be represented by Chinese-qualified
lawyers. 94 In a survey of legal professionals, judges, and academics
following the announcement of the CICC, many expressed concerns

regarding the need for clear-cut procedural rules, uncertainty
regarding the functionality of a one-stop dispute-resolution
mechanism, and the finality of mediated settlements and arbitral
awards. 95 With the first batch of cases received, speculation continues
regarding whether the CICC can gain international legitimacy and
96
provide special value for parties.

Overall, however, these concerns for a specifically Chinese/BRI
court system are similar to those raised when considering the
difficulties arising under arbitration as an alternative form of dispute

resolution. When examining avenues for dispute resolution, one may

See, e.g., Noah Barkin & Aleksandar Vasovic, Chinese 'Highway to Nowhere'
92.
Haunts Montenegro, REUTERS (July 16, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chinasilkroad-europe-montenegro-insi/chinese-highway-to-nowhere-haunts-montenegroidUSKBN1K60QX [https://perma.cc/8VTA-GFCU] (archived July 20, 2020).
According to the court's documents, such prerequisites include:
93.
(1) First instance international commercial cases in which the
parties have chosen the jurisdiction of the Supreme People's Court
according to Article 34 of the Civil Procedure Law, with an amount in
dispute of at least 300,000,000 Chinese yuan;
(2) First instance international commercial cases which are subject
to the jurisdiction of the higher people's courts who nonetheless consider
that the cases should be tried by the Supreme People's Court for which
permission has been obtained;
(3) First instance international commercial cases that have a
nationwide significant impact;
(4) Cases involving applications for preservation measures in
arbitration, for setting aside or enforcement of international commercial
arbitration awards according to Article 14 of these Provisions; and
(5) Other international commercial cases that the Supreme People's
Court considers appropriate to be tried by the International Commercial
Court.
Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Regarding the
Establishment of the International Commercial Court art. 2 (June 27, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/733J-XGQR]
http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/219/199/201/817.html
(archived July 20, 2020). Note also that as of January 11, 2020, CNY 300 million converts
to over USD 43.3 million.
See Lingard, Choong, Kirkness, Apostolova & Liu, supra note 90.
94.
See Zihao Zhou, Nathan Harpainter & Yuan Emily Cao, Survey Results: Rules
95.
on China's International Commercial Court, 3 CHINA L. CONNECT 21, 23-25.

96.
See Matthew S. Erie, Update on the China International Commercial Court,
OPINIOJURIS (May 13, 2019), http://opiniojuris.org/2019/05/13/update-on-the-chinainternational-commercial-court [https://perma.cc/JHB4-CK96] (archived July 20, 2020)
("Among seasoned lawyers in China, there is scepticism towards the CICC as to whether
it can gain international legitimacy and also provide dispute resolution services that are
otherwise unmet by existing options for international commercial arbitration.").
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think of arbitration as a strong alternative to going to the courts. In

considering challenges for arbitration of BRI-related disputes, Patrick
Norton identified that neutral venues and administering institutions

for arbitrations are crucial to combat the doubts inherent in the use of
regular Chinese court systems. 97 Such neutrality is vital for proper

resolution of these disputes as "[b]y definition . .. Chinese venues and
Chinese arbitral institutions will not be 'neutral' for BRI-related

disputes." 98 Others may argue, however, that Chinese venues and
arbitral institutions would be appropriate given that the BRI projects
are generally funded by Chinese institutions. 99 Given that the
Singapore International Arbitration Centre and the Hong Kong
International Arbitration Centre have risen to a certain level of
prominence in the international arbitral community, either could be
selected for their global proximity over other leading arbitral
institutions.1 00 Notably, however, the leading institutions have
increased their Asian presence because of the increasing number of
cases in the region, 10 1 so the argument over Chinese venues and
institutions being the most appropriate may be moot. Taking into
account that China has been moving towards a less restrictive
reciprocity
system
for
foreign
judgment
recognition
and

enforcement,1 02 the CICC may not offer as much value as proponents
anticipate. However, the value of the CICC remains to be seen as the
first few cases proceed.
4. Detrimental Environmental Impacts
Another rights-based issue rarely touched on is the BRI's
environmental effect outside of the energy context.1 03 While China's

recent efforts to lead the way towards renewable energy have been
well-lauded,1 04 the dangers of ecological damage have been ignored.

97.

Norton, supra note 28, at 93.

98.
99.

Id.
Id.

100. Such institutions include the London Court of International Arbitration
("LCIA"), International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") and the International Center for
Dispute Resolution ("ICDR"). Id. at 73-74.
101. Id. at 91-92.
102. See Jie Huang, Enforcing Foreign Monetary Judgments in China:
Breakthroughs,Challenges, and Solutions in the Context of "One Belt One Road", 51 GEo.
WASH. INT'L L. REV. 105, 105-06 (2019).
103. See John Mathews & Hao Tan, China's New Silk Road: Is It Black or Green?,
ENERGYPOST.EU (Apr. 24, 2017), https://energypost.eu/chinas-new-silk-road-will-itcontribute-to-export-of-the-black-fossil-fueled-economy/_[https://perma.cc/2FRZ-FT9K]
(archived July 20, 2020).
104. See, e.g., Christopher Mahoney, Note, The Geopolitical Implications of the
&

United States of America's Withdrawalfrom the ParisAgreement, 2 CARDOZO J. INT'L

COMP. L. 282, 308-15 (2018); Daniel Araya, China's Belt and Road Initiative Is Poised
To Transform the Clean Energy Industry, BROOKINGs INST. (Nov. 27, 2018),
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Analysis by the WWF (formerly known as the World Wildlife Fund)
found that BRI corridors had significant overlap with environmentally
sensitive areas. 105 Although the WWF's analysis is from 2017,106

further expansion of the BRI into Africa and South America increases
the likelihood that the number of sensitive environments in BRI
corridors is much higher today.
China signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the UN

Development Program (UNDP) in September 2016, pledging to operate
in accordance with the Sustainable Development Goals.1 07 However,
whether China has paid close attention to environmental reports, in
general, is questionable. Consider the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam in

Ecuador, which was built near an active volcano that geologists say
could destroy the dam. 108 Although the dam is currently still standing,
it is a concern that a Chinese diplomat admitted that the dam was built
near the volcano because the officials in charge "didn't give sufficient

https://www.brookings.edulblog/techtank/2018/ 11/27/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-is9
poised-to-transform-the-clean-energy-industry/_[https://perma.cc/ VYH-72QJ] (archived
July 20, 2020) (describing the BRI's potential to greatly expand China's use of clean
energy).
105. WWF and Greening the Belt and Road, WWF H.K., (Nov. 2, 2017),
https://www.wwf.org.hk/en/?19680/Feature-Story-WWF-and-Greening-the-Belt-andRoad-Initiative_[https://perma.cc/KUR6-EAFJ] (archived July 20, 2020) [hereinafter
WWF and Greening the Belt and Road]. The Belt and Road corridors are geographic areas
targeted for economic development. See Hans-Peter Brunner, What is Economic Corridor
Development and What Can It Achieve in Asia's Subregions? 1 (Asian Dev. Bank,
Working Paper No. 117, 2013). There are six land-based corridors: the New Eurasian
Land Bridge, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the China-Mongolia-Russia
Economic Corridor, the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor, the
China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor, and the China-Central Asia-West Asia
Economic Corridor. BELT AND
CORRIDORS,
TRANSPORT

AND
3

ROAD ECONOMICS: OPPORTUNITIES
Grp.,
Bank
World

RISKS OF
(2019),

878 9 78 4 64 8 3 92 4
.p
1
1
/
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/31
df [https://perma.cc/8SQ4-YC2D] (archived July 20, 2020).
106. See WWF and Greening the Belt and Road, supra note 105.
107. See UNDP and China to Cooperate on Belt and Road Initiative, U.N. DEv.
2016),
19,
(Sept.
PROGRAMME

https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/

2

016/09/19/und

[https://perma.cc/3RBDp-and-china-to-cooperate-on-belt-and-road-initiative.html
HHYD] (archived July 20, 2020) (reporting the signing of the MOU).
108. Out of eight hydroelectric projects in Ecuador by 2018, Chinese institutions
financed six, including Coca Codo. Maria C. Vallejo, Betty Espinosa, Francisco Venes,
Victor Lopez & Susana Anda, Evading sustainable development standards: Case studies
on hydroelectric projects in Ecuador 2 (B.U. Glob. Dev. Pol'y Ctr., Working Paper 019,
2018). Although the work on this project began before the formal announcement of the
Belt and Road Initiative, the project ultimately came under the BRI umbrella. See
DANIEL KLIMAN, RUSH DOSHI, KRISTINE LEE & ZACK COOPER, GRADING CHINA'S BELT
https://www.wita.org/wp(2019),
10
7-8,
ROAD
AND

content/uploads/2019/04/CNASReportChinaBeltandRoad-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GGF5-RJTR] (archived July 20, 2020) (referring to the Coca Codo Dam
project as part of the Belt and Road Initiative).
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attention to the environmental reporting."109 The project proceeded
despite early opposition from community leaders, 110 warnings from
several Ecuadoran officials, and an independent report by a Mexican
government agency in 2010 indicating a high level of risk and the need

for a new study to assess the surrounding circumstances.111
Furthermore, because of inadequate safety measures throughout the
course of the project, one hundred people died, one million people were
ultimately displaced, and forests were destroyed.1" 2

Because of the damage inflicted in Ecuador, one may wonder if
greater attention was given to significant environmental concerns in

later projects like those in Pakistan and Myanmar. In Pakistan, the
answer to that question is a resounding "no" with respect to the East
Bay Expressway project.11 3 Despite assurances from Pakistani Prime
Minister Imran Khan regarding inclusive consideration coupled with
significant local protest, the highway project proceeded without
addressing local fishermen's concerns on the lack of transparency and
without any form of impact analysis on locals' livelihoods." 4 When

project leaders actively choose to ignore the environmental impacts of
the BRI projects, the consequences can affect both the environment and
local residents. Part III.B briefly explores the international legal
implications of ignoring local peoples and the potential environmental
impacts of infrastructure projects.

This

109. Nicholas Casey & Clifford Krauss, It Doesn't Matter if Ecuador Can't Afford
Dam.
China Still
Gets Paid., N.Y. TIMEs
(Dec.
24,
2018),

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/24/world/americas/ecuador-china-dam.html

[https://perma.cc/B4LN-48Q3] (archived July 20, 2020).
Max Nathanson, Damming or Damning the Amazon: Assessing Ecuador

/

110.

China
Cooperation,
MONGABAY
(Nov.
22,
2017),
https://news.mongabay.com/2017/11/damming-or-damning-the-amazon-assessingecuador-china-cooperation/ [https://perma.cc/LJB3-NZDG] (archived July 20, 2020)
("[L]ocal communities surrounding the CCS construction site were opposed to it during
the planning period, but were too small to challenge the power of the Correa
Administration, which approved the environmental impact assessment for the CELEC
Coca Codo Sinclair project through its Environment Ministry. 'It would have been David
versus Goliath,' said the leader.").
111. Casey & Krauss, supra note 109 ("Despite the advice, Luciano Cepeda, the
dam's former general manager, said top Ecuadorean officials pressed ahead anyway

because "a new study would have taken several years" and they didn't want to slow
down."). Anticipated environmental effects of the project according to an independent
analysis of the dam's environmental impact assessment included "deforestation;
improper waste removal impacting domestic water supplies; changes in subterranean
runoff; fluctuations in water flows, sediment levels, and flood patterns; and threats to
flora and fauna in the surrounding Cayambe-Coca National Park and Sumaco Natural

Reserve." Nathanson, supra note 110.
112.

Casey & Krauss, supra note 109.

113.

See, e.g., China: "Belt and Road" Projects, supra note 69.

114.

See id.
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THE POWER OF WORDS AND THE REACTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY

Since the beginning of the BRI, the business world has been alight

with enthusiasm for new investment opportunities. 115 Conversely,
many legal scholars and news reporters have focused on the "evils" of
China's increased global participation, but much of their attention is
misplaced. Concerns about the direct impacts of predatory agreements
and the general increase in human rights violations are valid, but they
are only one part of the greater picture of the growing Chinese soft
power.

If others refuse to address the unfettered growth of China's
influence throughout the world, the current negative effects of the BRI
discussed in the previous Part will likely increase in magnitude and

scope. This Part of the Note offers a unique in-depth analysis of
resolutions and consequences that remain largely ignored by the
international community. Specifically, this Part explores how
increased participation in international human rights dialogue and

advocacy for particular language-what may seem like ancillary
actions to the BRI-contribute to maintaining and increasing China's
global influence. This Part then discusses why the current lack of a

strong, unified global response to adequately address the threats posed
by China's actions is troubling.

A. China'sActions at the Human Rights Council and Security Council
1. United Nations Human Rights Council
China's increasing participation in the international human

rights dialogue has garnered interest from both advocates and critics
of China. Advocates may argue that this is a good sign for China,
signaling to the international community that China understands
other states' concerns and that it is working to join the international
116
Critics answer that instead of
agenda of promoting human rights.

115. See, e.g., Repaving the Ancient Silk Routes, PwC GROWTH MKTS. CTR., (2017),
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/growth-markets-centre/assets/pdf/pwc-gme-repaving-theancient-silk-routes-web-full.pdf [https://perma.cc/87VX-A8P9] (archived July 20, 2020)
(discussing the BRI and its potential economic impact on business); Jonathan Bench,
How Your Company Can Benefit from China's Belt and Road Initiative, Part 1, CHINA L.
BLOG (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.chinalawblog.com/2019/09/how-your-company-canbenefit-from-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-part-1.htmljlhttps://perma.cc/3KMC-5E9L
(archived July 20, 2020) (assessing business strategies based on the implications of the
BRI).
116. See International Law Programme Roundtable, Exploring Public
InternationalLaw Issues with Chinese Scholars - Part 4, CHATHAM HOUSE (June 2-3,
2018), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-0602-Roundtable4-summary.pdf_[https://perma.cc/FK68-UHCE] (archived July 20, 2020).
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altering its own policies to promote human rights, China is working to

alter the international community's perceptions and definitions of
human rights in order to give itself more leeway for its policies. 117

Either way, both sides seem to agree that China has a significant
ability to affect international human rights, whether positively or
negatively.
Throughout the past few years, concerns 118 regarding how China
would use its increasingly active role on the then-UN Commission on
Human Rights and later the UN Human Rights Council 119 have
materialized. 12 0 One of the most prominent concerns was that China
would leverage its position to encourage other states to emulate its own
human rights practices.1 21 China's actions at the Human Rights

For further optimism regarding expected benefits from the Belt and Road Initiative, see
Peter Cai, Understanding China'sBelt and Road Initiative, LOWY INST. FOR INT'L POL'Y
(Mar.

2017)

https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/understanding-belt-and-road-

initiative [https://perma.cc/5QRH-S5S6] (archived July 20, 2020).
117. See generally Ted Piccone, China'sLong Game on Human Rights at the United
Nations,
FOREIGN
POL'Y
AT
BROOKINGS
INST.
(Sept.
2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-

content/uploads/2018/09/FP_20181009_china_humanrights.pdf
Ihttps://perma.cc/DWM7-BDE3] (archived July 20, 2020) (exploring China's growing role
on the U.N. Human Rights Council and how this role had led to some States muting their
criticism of China's prior actions).
118. See id. at 5-6; Miloon Kothari, China's Trojan Horse Human Rights
Resolution, DIPLOMAT (Mar. 22, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/chinas-trojanhorse-human-rights-resolution/ [https://perma.cc/4B4N-JNDR] (archived July 20, 2020)
(expressing skepticism about China's intentions to honor human rights resolutions); SuiLee Wee & Stephanie Nebehay, At U.N., China uses intimidation tactics to silence its
critics, REUTERS (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/specialreport/china-softpower-rights/ [https://perma.cc/99A3-96EP] (archived July 20, 2020)
(discussing China's attempts to intimidate other countries in order to suppress
individuals who would speak out about its human rights record).
119. From 1946-2006, the Commission on Human Rights served as the United
Nation's governing body for human rights. In 2006, the United Nations General
Assembly voted to replace the Commission with the current governing body, the Human
Rights Council. See G.A. Res. 60/251 (Mar. 15, 2006); Press Release, General Assembly,
General Assembly Establishes New Human Rights Council by Vote of 170 in Favour to
4 Against, With 3 Abstentions, U.N. Press Release GA/10449 (Mar. 15, 2006).
120. For a case study of Chinese interventions at the United Nations hindering
actions that would promote human rights in China and in other Member States, see The
Costs of International Advocacy,
HUM.
RTs. WATCH (Sept. 5,
2017),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/09/05/costs-international-advocacy/chinas-

interference-united-nations-human-rights_[https://perma.cc/Z7L9-K68P] (archived July
20, 2020).
121. See, e.g., Lindsay Maizland, Is China Undermining Human Rights at the
United Nations?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 9, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/inbrief/china-undermining-human-rights-united-nations
[https://perma.cc/2QUY-LW48]
(archived July 20, 2020); Ryan Mitchell, Was the UN Human Rights Council Wrong to
Back China's "Shared Future"Resolution?, EJIL: TALK! BLOG OF THE EUR. J. OF INT'L L.
(Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/was-the-un-human-rights-council-wrong-toback-chinas-shared-future-resolution/ [https://perma.cc/9U8X-6FYN] (archived July 20,
2020) ('There has also been considerable criticism [of the March 23, 2018 Human Rights
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Council since 2016 indicate that such concerns are significant. A
handful of these actions include attempting to delegitimize human

rights defenders through the proposal of an amendment to a human
rights resolution,1 22 weakening state obligations to cooperate with UN
1 23
and sponsoring resolutions
Human Rights Council mechanisms,
24
and state security 1 25 over human rights. Of
promoting development1

particular relevance to this Note are China's actions to promote
development and state security to the detriment of human rights.
In March 2018, the Human Rights Council adopted the resolution
entitled "Promoting mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of
human rights."12 6 The language of the resolution provides support for
BRI programs in two ways: (1) by reaffirming the right to development

in those realms that we value most: human, civil, political, economic,
social and cultural rights1 27 and (2) by emphasizing the need for
29
technical assistance1 28 and capacity building1 to promote cooperation

Council resolution] by legal experts and political officials in the West, who have argued
that China's resolution is an attempt to indirectly excuse its own rights lapses or to dilute
the idea of international monitoring.").
122. Human Rights Council Amend. 31/L.47, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/L.47 (Mar. 22,
2016) (recording a failed amendment to replace "human rights defenders" with
"individuals, groups and organs of society engaged in promotion and protection of human
rights" and "importantactivities" to "lawful activities").
123. Human Rights Council Amend. 35/L.51, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/36/L.51 (Sept. 26,
2017) (recording a successful amendment removing the affirmation encouraging States
to "prevent, investigate and ensure accountability for acts of intimidation or reprisal"
against those who choose to cooperate with U.N. human rights procedures).
124. Human Rights Council Res. 35/L.33/Rev.1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/35/L.33/Rev.1
(June 20, 2017) (recording a successful solo-sponsored resolution underscoring state-tostate cooperation in the context of sustainable and inclusive development).
125. Human Rights Council Res. 37/23, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/37/23 (Mar. 23, 2018)
("Promoting mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of human rights").
126. Id.; see, e.g., Kothari, supra note 118 (reporting the adoption of the resolution).
127. H.R.C. Res. 37/23, supra note 125, ¶ 6.
128. Technical assistance itself is not a novel concept. See Book Note, Les Aspects
Juridiques de l'Assistance Technique dans le Cadre des Nations Unies et des Institutions
Specialisees [Legal Aspects of Technical Assistance in the Framework of the United
Nations and Specialized Institutions], 71 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1190 (1958) (footnote
omitted) ("Novel as the concept of technical assistance is sometimes thought to be, it has
figured in international law at least since the eighteenth century. Each nation, wrote
Vattel in 1757, 'should contribute to . . . [other states'] advancement according to its
ability and their need of its help."'). The basis for the United Nations' authority in
technical assistance stems from Resolution 222 (IX) of the Economic and Social Council.
Economic and Social Council Res. 222 (IX) (Aug. 15, 1949). The United Nations Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights explains that technical assistance can take
various forms, including "expert advisory services, training courses, workshops and
seminars, fellowships, grants, provision of information and documentation, and
assessment of domestic human right's needs." U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for
Human
Rights,
Technical
Cooperation,
(last
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/Pages/TechnicalCooperationIndex.aspx
visited Feb. 21, 2020) [https://perma.cc/W4NH-G2BV] (archived July 18, 2020).
129. The United Nations Development Programme distinguishes between
different types of capacity as well as the difference between capacity building and
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in human rights.1 30 The drafting of the resolution thus serves to
reiterate the connection between the right to development and human
rights. At the same time, the resolution conveniently lays some
foundation for the supplanting of the importance of human rights to

eventually cast technical ability and capacity building as an a priori
requirement. This would ultimately allow China to demand, or at least
hold hostage, future human rights resolutions that do not allow or
require capacity building.

The right to development131 is an important cornerstone of the
Chinese strategy.13 2 The right to development was established after
the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Right to
Development to address underdevelopment.1 33 The Chinese
government's December 2016 white paper articulated its own view of
the right to development, highlighting it as "a unity of individual and

collective human rights."1 3 4 The statement emphasizes that the right
to development is essential to human society and requires equal access
to development opportunities and development benefits.1 35 Isolated as
a policy position of China, this concept seems important yet harmless.
When this concept is viewed in connection with the emphasis on the
right to development in the Human Rights Council resolution,

capacity development. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, CAPACITY
DEVELOPMENT: A UNDP PRIMER 54 (2009). The UNDP defines capacity building as "[a]
process that supports only the initial stages of building or creating capacities and
assumes that there are no existing capacities to start from. See id. Also note that the
indicator for measuring progress on Sustainable Development Goal 17.9 to enhance
international support for capacity-building is "Dollar value of financial and technical
assistance (including through North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation)
committed to developing countries." U.N. Secretary-General, Sustainable Development
Goal 17, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgl7 (last visited Feb. 24, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/W85U-Z64R] (archived Aug. 23, 2020).
130. See H.R.C. Res. 37/23, supra note 125, ¶ 9, 10, 11, 16, 19 (discussing the
desire and need for cooperation to promote human rights).
131. The right to development is defined by the Declaration on the Right to
Development. G.A. Res. 41/128, art. 1, ¶ 1 (Dec. 4, 1986) ("The right to development is
an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are
entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political
development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully
realized.").
132. For more on China's work regarding the right to development, see generally
Li Erping & Yao Yunsong, The Contribution of the Belt and Road Initiative to the Global
Right to Development, in THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND
THE PRACTICE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE (Wei Zhang ed., 2019) (exploring the right to

development in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative).
133. G.A. Res. 41/128, supra note 131, ¶¶ 1-16 (discussing the purposes and
rationale behind the right to development).
134.

STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, FULL TEXT: THE RIGHT

TO DEVELOPMENT: CHINA'S PHILOSOPHY, PRACTICE AND CONTRIBUTION (Dec. 1, 2016),
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white-paper/2016/12/01/content_281475505407672.h
tm [https://perma.cc/R2GM-DDTW] (archived July 18, 2020) (no pagination).
135. Id.
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however, the articulation of a right to development warrants more
concern. By using this reaffirming language in the resolution, China
fortified its justifications for the BRI, bolstering the perceived
importance of the program.

Further troubling are the footholds

created for technical

cooperation and capacity building in the resolution. The resolution
places significant emphasis on these features, interlinking them with

the successful promotion of mutually beneficial cooperation to promote
and protect human rights.136 The resolution's request for the Human
Rights Council Advisory Committee to study the role of technical

assistance and capacity building1 37 is another tool for these footholds.

This study is currently ongoing. Of the fourteen published state

responses to the Advisory Committee's open call for comments, about
half of the responses supported the promotion of mutually beneficial
cooperation (also termed as "win-win cooperation"), while the other
half explicitly denounced its use due to a lack of foundation and support
in international human rights law.138 China's submission explicitly

heralds the benefits of technical assistance and capacity building in
139
China is
promoting human rights through win-win cooperation.

deeply invested in a positive report on these tactics in order to provide
another layer of justification for the BRI.
Not only do these inclusions reaffirm the right to development, but
they create further links between human rights and security. Canada's
submission to the Advisory Committee focuses on the links between
mutually beneficial cooperation and win-win cooperation, paying

special attention to three illustrative instances of the use of the
phrases by different Chinese agents to emphasize the phrases' ties to
40
economic development, peace and security, and human rights.1

136. H.R.C. Res. 37/23, supra note 125, ¶¶ 9, 10, 11, 16, 19.
137. Id. ¶ 19.
at
available
are
responses
State
published
the
of
138. All
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/AdvisoryCommittee/Pages/TheRoleTechnica
lAssistance.aspx_(last visited Aug. 23, 2020) [https://perma.ec/2WMB-PDRN] (archived
July 18, 2020). The State responses explicitly discouraging use of the phrase "mutually
beneficial cooperation" include Australia, Canada, Germany/France (joint submission),
Japan, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. In contrast, the State
responses encouraging win-win cooperation appear to be China, C6te d'Ivoire, Kuwait,
Morocco, Mauritius, the Philippines, and Russia.
139. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, REPLY TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE OF THE
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE ROLE OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
AND CAPACITY BUILDING IN FOSTERING MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL COOPERATION 3-5 (2018),

https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/AdvisoryCom/TechnicalAssist
ance/ChinaEnglish.pdf_{https://perma.cc/Z9XT-25XX] (archived Aug. 2, 2020).
140. See CANADA REPLY TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
THE ROLE OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND CAPACITY BUILDING IN FOSTERING MUTUALLY
(2018),
1-2
COOPERATION
BENEFICIAL

https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/AdvisoryCom/TechnicalAssist
ance/CANADA.docx.
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Although promoting economic development is important, win-win
cooperation for capacity building and technical assistance should not
be prioritized over international cooperation that promotes human
rights in line with the UN Charter. 141 The danger of this link is
explored in further detail in the following Part on China's actions as a
permanent member of the UN Security Council,1 4 2 but the gist is that
by characterizing the right to development as an essential human right
and linking its protection to technical assistance and capacity building,
China has created links between development and security that it can
rely upon to justify its actions under the BRI.

Two less obvious but still notable aspects of the resolution are the
language-reaffirming human rights treaties 143 and the emphasis of the
Universal Periodic Review's role.14 4 The relevant language seems
hypocritical when examined in the context of Chinese sponsorship,
given that China has been heavily criticized for its own human rights
abuses. 145 China has adopted both declarations1 4 6 and signed both

141. See id. at 3 (discussing the cooperation framework the U.N. charter
established).
142. See discussion infra Part III.A.2 and accompanying notes.
143. H.R.C. Res. 37/23, supra note 125, ¶ 1 ("Reaffirming the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, and
recalling all relevant international human rights treaties, including the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights").
144. Id. ¶¶ 12, 17 ("Recognizing also the role of the universal periodic review in,
inter alia, promoting the universality, interdependence, indivisibility and
interrelatedness of all human rights, establishing a cooperative mechanism based on
objective and reliable information and on interactive dialogue, and ensuring universal
coverage and equal treatment of all States in contributing to the promotion and
protection of human rights and mutually beneficial cooperation... Emphasizes the
importance of the universal periodic review as a mechanism based on cooperation and
constructive dialogue with the objective of, inter alia, improving the situation of human
rights on the ground and promoting the fulfilment of the human rights obligations and
commitments undertaken by States, and calls upon all States and relevant stakeholders
to participate constructively in it"). The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is the process
by which the UPR Working Group of the Human Rights Council reviews each Member
State's human rights records, addresses their human rights violations, and offers
recommendations on how Member States can more effectively handle human rights
challenges. See Basic Facts About the UPR, U.N. HUM. RTS. COUNcIL,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pages/basicfacts.aspx (last visited Jan. 20, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/DA73-BVCD] (archived July 18, 2020).
145. See, e.g., Wee & Nebehay, supra note 118 (reporting on China's use of
intimidation tactics against dissidents). On human rights abuses related to the Belt and
Road Initiative, see discussion supra Part II.B.1. and accompanying notes.
146.

The two declarations referenced are the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights reaffirms fundamental freedoms agreed upon by the United Nations
General Assembly. G.A. Res. 217A (III) (Dec. 10, 1948). The 1993 Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action-World Conference on Human Rights stressed that all human
rights and fundamental freedoms are "universal, indivisible and interdependent and
interrelated" while considering that "[d]emocracy, development and respect for human
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treaties reaffirmed in the resolution. 14 7 However, of the two treaties,
China has ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights 148 with reservations, but has still yet to ratify the
9
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.14 The emphasis

on the role of the Universal Periodic Review is initially surprising
because Chinese delegates have dodged questions regarding incidents
of human rights abuses, 150 and China has low action rates on a
majority of recommendations arising from its reviews. 151 Some

rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing." See
World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶¶
5, 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (June 25, 1993).
147. The resolution specifically reaffirms the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. See H.R.C. Res. 37/23, supra note 125, 1 1.
148. ICESCR, supra note 65.
149. ICCPR, supra note 65. For more on China's human rights policies and actions
related to the ICCPR, see Lewis, supra note 67.
150. See Yu-Jie Chen, China's Challenge to the International Human Rights
Regime, 51 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1179, 1189-90 (2019). Chen explains:
The government delegation, for instance, often resorts to
formalism when answering human rights treaty bodies. Usually
citing laws and regulations while avoiding any discussion of practice
and concrete cases, Chinese diplomats continue to eschew
meaningful exchanges about the PRC's human rights record. Beijing
also uses discrediting tactics, such as attacking the credibility of
interested civil society groups, in some cases harassing treaty body
experts and U.N. officials and accusing them of being politically
biased, and liberal democracies of engaging in "double standards."
China further works with countries in the Like-Minded Group (a
group of developing countries that tends to vote as a bloc) to
undermine the ability of the U.N. human rights mechanisms. The
members of the Like-Minded Group often share China's interests in
avoiding international human rights scrutiny by diminishing the
strength of the international human rights institutions. China and
Russia, for example, led many countries in the Group to present
proposals that would limit the independence of the treaty bodies and
increase state oversight of the system in what was supposed to be a
treaty body strengthening process.
Id. (internal footnotes omitted).
151. See, e.g., Junxiang Mao & Xi Sheng, Strength of Review and Scale of Response:
A Quantitative Analysis of Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review on China,
23 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (2016-2017) ("[T]he rate of implemented
recommendations for China is lower than that of the international community....").
China has also been very particular about which recommendations it chooses to accept
or reject. Mao & Sheng further explain:
[I]f a recommendation includes a slightly more precise
requirement than another on the same subject, even though the
content of the two are roughly the same, China may reject the former
and accept the latter. For instance, China accepted the
recommendation "Take steps to an early ratification of the ICCPR"
by Czech Republic while refusing the recommendation "Move
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that

participation in and cooperation with the Universal Periodic Review

system is sufficient to promote human rights because China is not
obligated to respond to or change any of its own policies. 152 China's
disregard for the recommendations proffered by the very mechanism it
has verbally supported appear hypocritical at best. The desire to

promote respect for sovereignty is admirable; however, to do so in a
way that undermines the promotion of fundamental rights under the
guise of supporting widespread respect for such rights taints this
approach.

Overall, all of these little pieces support China's view that human
rights issues should ultimately be handled at the domestic level. This
view is mirrored clearly in the following Part exploring China's actions
on an even larger and more powerful platform: the UN Security

Council.
2. United Nations Security Council
Reexamining the broader implications of China's increased role in
shaping international human rights should include an analysis of
China's related actions as a member of the UN Security Council. China
has leveraged its position as a permanent member of the Security
Council to stall votes on important resolutions when other council
members have disagreed with the inclusion of language friendly to
China's BRI development endeavors. 5 3 The glaring concern for such

actions is that they feed into the greater agenda of conflating security
and development in a way that threatens the hierarchical necessity of
security over development.

towards ratification of the ICCPR in the near future" by Norway.
China responds to recommendations "according to its economic and
social development." When recommendations require concrete
actions and do not accommodate China's basic public policy and
actual circumstances, China will explicitly reject them. Examples
include recommendations to abolish the death penalty, to accept the
individual complaint procedure, to invite State Parties to investigate,
or to extend standing invitations to special procedures.
See id. at 38 (internal footnotes omitted).
152. The Universal Periodic Review defers to States' sovereignty as "states have
considerable freedom to accept or reject recommendations and whether to implement
them." See id. at 39.
153. See China and US Clash over Belt and Road' Link to UN Afghanistan
Mission,
SOUTH
CHINA
MORNING
POST
(Sept.
17,
2019),
https://www.scmp.com/print/news/china/diplomacy/article/3027596/china-and-us-clash-

over-belt-and-road-credit-un-security_[https://perma.cc/R2P7-DHMX] (archived July 18,
2020) [hereinafter China-US UNAMA Clash] ("This is the second time in six months that
the resolution to keep the UN political mission in Afghanistan operating has become
embroiled in controversy over belt and road language.").
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The recent events surrounding the UN Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan (UNAMA) mandate highlight China's growing influence

on the Security Council.1 54 In September of 2019, the Security Council
55
passed a resolution to extend UNAMA's mandate for another year.1
Disagreements over wording led to the resolution passing less than
56
fourteen hours before the previous mandate expired.1 The significant

delay occurred because countries raised new concerns regarding the
inclusion of language welcoming and encouraging regional economic

cooperation in Afghanistan.1 57 Language of such nature, however, had
58
In March of
already been included in the prior three mandates.1

2019, only a six-month renewal was passed as debate over the
59
language's relevancy ensued.1

[T]he US government opposed China's demand "thatthe resolution highlight its
Belt and Road Initiative, despite its tenuous ties to Afghanistan and known
problems with corruption, debt distress, environmental damage, and lack of
transparency" . . . [while China's deputy ambassador] said belt and road was
16 0
"conducive to Afghanistan's reconstruction and economic development."

A notable concern among Security Council members after the

September 2019 mandate was passed was that the resolution was not
more

substantive.1 61

In

the

course

of

their

comments,

the

representatives from the United States, Belgium, and the United
Kingdom explicitly reemphasized their concern that the economic

154. The UNAMA mandate supports Afghanistan in ensuring credibility and
transparency with its upcoming presidential election and strengthen the capacitybuilding of the Afghan security forces, among other inter-Afghan peace developments.
See U.N. SCOR, 74th Sess., 8620th meeting at 3, 6 U.N. Doc. S/PV.8620 (Sept. 17, 2019)
[hereinafter UNAMA 2019 Meeting Minutes].
155. S.C. Res. 2489 (Sept. 17, 2019) [hereinafter UNAMA 2019 Resolution];
UNAMA 2019 Meeting Minutes, supra note 154, at 2.
156. Comments from Permanent Representative of Indonesia Dian Djani and
Deputy Permanent Representative of Poland Mariusz Lewicki most explicitly
demonstrate this frustration. See UNAMA 2019 Meeting Minutes, supra note 154, at 3,
7-8.
157. See China-US UNAMA Clash, supra note 153 (explaining the conflicts that
led to the resolution's delay). Compare UNAMA 2019 Resolution, supra note 155, with
S.C. Res. 2405 (Mar. 8, 2018) (including several instances of encouragement for economic
development), and S.C. Res. 2344 (Mar. 17, 2017) (same), and S.C. Res. 2274 (Mar. 15,
2016) (same).
158. See UNAMA 2019 Resolution, supra note 155; S.C. Res. 2405 (Mar. 8, 2018);
S.C. Res. 2344 (Mar. 17, 2017) (same); S.C. Res. 2274 (Mar. 15, 2016); see also China-US
UNAMA Clash, supra note 153.
159. See China-US UNAMA Clash, supra note 153.
160. Id.
161. See UNAMA 2019 Meeting Minutes, supra note 154, at 4, 5, 6, 7. Consider,
however, that this is in sharp contrast to Chinese Ambassador Zhang Jun's comments
"thatnow is not the time to adopt a comprehensive resolution." See id. at 6.
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development language was unnecessary. 162 Permanent Representative
Pecsteen de Buytswerve of Belgium specifically noted his
disappointment that a stronger resolution was not passed based on "an
issue not pertaining to the mandate." 163 The significance of the passing
of a weaker mandate was illustrated by Ambassador Karen Pierce of
the United Kingdom, who pointed out that "part of the text is, frankly,
not comprehensible in the English language" and therefore

"paragraphs of the resolution lack the clarity that UNAMA needs and
requests in order to deliver its mandate at such a difficult time."1 64 Not
a single member of the Security Council disputed that the UNAMA
mandate was necessary. However, the delayed timing and diminished
power of the mandate represent the external security risks imposed on
other states as collateral damage from China's pursuits.

Not only was the extreme delay in passing the UNAMA mandate
a concern regarding UNAMA's ability to execute its mission, but it also
signals how strongly China is fighting to entrench development
language in security issues. When China fights for the inclusion of such
language, it is able to use these Security Council resolutions to build
stronger ties between security and development. 165 These are similar
to concerns raised in the previous Part about China's inclusion of
technical assistance and capacity building in a Human Rights Council
resolution. 166 The implications of this are slow but long-lasting.

China's efforts seek to not only link security and development, but
to conflate security with development. As China embeds these
connections in the fabric of UN operations, a foundation is laid for
China to further justify the BRI and answer critiques with this

"evidence" of the legal permissibility and importance of the massive
infrastructure program for global development. Ambassador Zhang
Jun, the representative for China at the UNAMA vote, emphasized
"that helping the Afghan economy is vital to achieving lasting peace
and stability in that country." 167 Ambassador Zhang also responded to
the thinly-veiled critiques of the United States, Belgium, and the

United Kingdom by stating that a failure to recognize the importance
of promoting Afghanistan's regional cooperation and connectivity

162. See id. at 4, 5, 7 (discussing the best language to include regarding economic
development).
163. Id. at 5.
164.

See id. at 7.

165.

See id. at 6 ("In order to maintain security and stability in that country, we

must resolve security concerns. The unity of the Security Council must be maintained,

and, to that end, we must respect the past consensus that we achieved. It must be
stressed that helping the Afghan economy is vital to achieving lasting peace and stability
in the country. That is what the Afghan people want, and no country has the right to
deprive them of a better life.").
166. See discussion supra Part III.A and accompanying notes.
167. UNAMA 2019 Meeting Minutes, supra note 154, at 6.
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would be "an utter distortion of the UNAMA mandate."168 Broadly put,

UNAMA's

mandate

is

to

"provide[]

political

good

offices

in

Afghanistan; work[] with and support[] the government; support[] the
process of peace and reconciliation; monitor[] and promote[] human

rights and the protection of civilians in armed conflict; promote[] good
169
Although
governance; and encourage[] regional cooperation."
would contribute to
regional cooperation and connectivity
strengthening the Afghani economy, Ambassador's Zhang's argument
frames bolstering the country's economy as a prerequisite for peace and

security. In this way, the concepts can be conflated. While there is no
question that a stable economy is necessary for any country, the

establishment of such explicit textual links between security and
development in binding documents from a highly respected governing
body represents the risk of easy conflation of these distinct normative

goals in the future.
B. The Impacts of the Lack of a Strong, Unified International
Response

Few states have taken notice and criticized China's Belt and Road
behaviors. Although various countries have criticized some of China's

actions at the intergovernmental organization level,1

70

the lack of

meaningful negative response only spurs China on and, in some ways,

extends implicit approval of China's actions. Under the Lotus principle
that states may act in ways not prohibited by international law,171

168.
169.

Id.
Mandate,

U.N.

ASSISTANcE

MISSION

AFG.,

2020)
27,
May
visited
(last
https://unama.unmissions.org/mandate
[https://perma.c/5UGX-AX4G] (archived July 18, 2020).
170. Cf. UNAMA 2019 Meeting Minutes, supra note 154, at 4, 5, 7 (recording some
of these criticisms).
171. In the widely cited and debated Lotus case, the Permanent Court of
International Justice articulated that states have wide discretion in their own territories
and are only limited by prohibitions in international law. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.),
Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, ¶ 46-47 (Sept. 7). As the Court explained in its
analysis of France's alleged exclusive territorialjurisdiction over the collision between a
French ship and Turkish collier,
Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that
States may not extend the application of their laws and the
jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their
territory, [international law] leaves them in this respect a wide
measure of discretion, which is only limited in certain cases by
prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to
adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable. This
discretion left to States by international law explains the great
variety of rules which they have been able to adopt without objections
or complaints on the part of other States ... In these circumstances
all that can be required of a State is that it should not overstep the
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China's self-promoting MOUs brook no legal issues. But the ensuing
effects of the MOUs that violate international law do.1 72 Here, the
situation of the Uighurs and the lack of attention to environmental
impact assessments are illustrative of China violating established
norms of treaty and customary environmental law. China is able to
leverage other states' silence to these violations as implicit approval,
thereby laying the foundation for the creation of more permissive
customary law.
China's support of the treatment of the Uighurs likely violates
human rights treaties, including the ICCPR. But China is only a

signatory to the ICCPR, 173 and thus is arguably not bound by it.
Regardless of whether China is specifically bound by the ICCPR,
China's support of Uighur detention and reeducation can influence
international treaty norms. Among, other provisions, the ICCPR
obligates states to respect and ensure the rights of individuals on their
territory and within their jurisdiction,1 74 as well as to protect
individuals' rights to freedom of thought and religion 175 and to not be
arbitrarily detained.1 76 Although China is not obligated to protect
these rights under the ICCPR, China's status as an ICCPR signatory
creates an obligation under the Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on

the Law of Treaties (VCLT) "to refrain from acts which would defeat
the object and purpose of [the] treaty." 177 Because mistreatment of the
Uighurs as described here would surely defeat the purposes of the
ICCPR, China's actions surely constitute a violation of VCLT Article
18 obligations. Thus, China's support of Uighur mistreatment 178 is a

limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction; within
these limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty.
Id.
172.

See id.

173. ICCPR, supranote 65, at 260.
174. Id. art. 2(1) ("Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect
and to ensure all individuals within their territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Convenant, without distinction of any kind. . ..").
175. Id. arts. 18 ("right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion"), 27 (stating
the right of religious minorities to practice in their own communities).
176. Id. art. 9 (detailing covered individuals' "right to liberty and security of
person").

177. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 39, art. 18.
Although elements of the treaty like Article 18 were fairly progressive at the time of the
treaty's introduction, the VCLT is accepted in large part as reflecting customary
international law today. Oliver D6rr, Article 18: ObligationNot to Defeat the Object and
Purpose of a Treaty Priorto its Entry Into Force, in VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW oF
TREATIES, para. 5 (Oliver Dorr & Kirsten Schmalenbach eds., 2012); accord
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, pt.

III,

Introductory Note (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (quoting S. EXEC. DOC. L., 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
at 1 (1971)) (letter from U.S. Department of State acknowledging that "[a]lthough not
yet in force, the Convention is already generally recognized as the authoritative guide to
current treaty law and practice.").
178. E.g., Watson & Westcott, supra note 56.
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failure to observe its interim obligation under the VCLT and thus
undermines international treaty norms.
Disregard of environmental protection in BRI projects
undermines environmental law norms requiring environmental impact

assessments (EIAs) and consultation of locals. In Pulp Mills, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognized the use of EIAs as

customary international practice when the project "may have a
significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particular,

on a shared resource." 179 About a decade after Pulp Mills, Tseming
Yang argues that the duty to conduct an EIA on projects affecting
resources and the environment is a binding global norm of public
international law by surveying EIA legislation worldwide and
analyzing the practice as a "general principle of law recognized by
180
Yang's survey
civilized nations" consistent with the ICJ Statute.

found that at least 183 of the 197 jurisdictions surveyed recognize the
duty to use EIAs. 18 1 The duty to conduct an EIA encompasses other
and
transparency
government
including
norms,
subsidiary
182
Thus, the Ecuadorian government's lack
engagement of the public.

of transparency, accountability, and public engagement in the Coca

179. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 135, ¶
204 (Apr. 20). The Court has previously recognized a State's duty to protect and respect
the environment. E.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J, 226, 1 29 (July 8) (recognizing a State's customary law obligation
"to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment
of other States or of areas beyond national control .... ").
180. Tseming Yang, The Emergence of the Environmental Impact Assessment Duty
as a Global Legal Norm and General Principle of Law, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 525, 527, 558
(2019) (citing Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1031, 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993).
181. Id. Professor Yang's survey considered legislation from "the 193 member
states of the United Nations, the European Union, the Holy See, Palestine, and Taiwan."
Id. at 527 n.1.
182. Id. at 529 ("While conceptually simple, the EIA norm is thus an umbrella
principle that embodies a number of more specific duties. These subsidiary norms
include the requirement to generate particular types of impact information, actual
consideration of such information by the decision-maker, governmental transparency
and accountability, and engagement of the public."). "According to most interpretations
of the principle, precautionary decisions are those that prevent damage to health or
ecosystems in the face of uncertainty, stimulate the development of more healthprotective technologies and activities, and place greater responsibility on proponents of
potentially damaging activities." See WHO Secretariat for the Fourth Ministerial
Conference on Environment and Health, Dealing with Uncertainty - How Can the
Precautionary Principle Help Protect the Future of Our Children? ¶ 10, (WHO, Working
Paper No. EUR/04/5046267/11, 2004). Although the Pulp Mills majority did not
recognize the precautionary principle as custom, Judge Trindade argued in his separate
opinion that the precautionary principle was in fact a general principle of law and "[i]n
so far as the environment is concerned, the emergence of the precautionary principle
brought about the requirement to undertake complete environmental impact
assessments, and the obligations of notification and of sharing information with the local
population (and, in extreme cases, even with the international community)." Pulp Mills,
2010 I.C.J. 135 ¶ 71 (separate opinion by Trindade, J.).
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Codo Dam project seems to violate such norms. 18 3 But these issues are
not just attributable to Ecuador-Ecuadorian officials reported that
labor and safety regulations were ignored at the instruction of Chinese
officials, 184 and former Ecuadorian Vice President Jorge Glas Espinel
was later investigated for accepting Chinese bribes to overlook
problems with the dam. 185 China's ability to affect environmental law

norms reaches beyond its own borders.
China's violations of treaty and environmental norms are still yet
smaller pieces of the greater picture. By not responding to the effects
of China's BRI projects, the international community is implicitly
approving China's actions to ultimately reshape the right of
development. By increasing its influence and ability to influence other
states under the BRI, China is laying the foundation to strengthen

future claims that the right to development is a broad, essential human
right inextricably linked to security. The following analysis explores
two views, forming customary international law and hardening soft

law, by which China's actions contribute to this new approach.
Implicit approval of China's actions should be avoided in order to
stymie the development of customary international law supporting

developmental actions as an essential element of security. Customary
international law is a hard, binding source of international law
comprised of widespread state practice and opiniojuris.186 The concept

of widespread state practice does not require that all states perform
the practice, though participation in the formation of custom is equal
among all nations. 18 7 While the creation of customary international

law does not require a minimum passage of time, the passage of time

183. See discussion supra Part II.B.4 and accompanying notes.
184. Nathanson, supra note 110.
185. Chris Kraul, Ecuador Faces a Huge Budget Deficit Because of Loans It
Received from China, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fgecuador-loans-china-20181210-story.html
[https://perma.cc/94HU-KUK4]
(archived
July 18, 2020). In 2017, Espinel was convicted on a corruption charge related to another
infrastructure project. Reuters, Ecuador's Vice President Sentenced to 6 Years in
Corruption
Case,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
13,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/world/americas/ecuadors-vice-president-

sentenced-to-6-years-in-corruption-case.html
[https://perma.cc/H4H3-33X8] (archived
July 18, 2020).
186. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055, 1060; NOORA ARAJARVI, THE CHANGING NATURE OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW: METHODS OF INTERPRETING THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 1 (2014) (giving an overview of art. 38(1)(b)).
187. See MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE POWER OF RULES 75 (1999)

("[A]ll States, from the weakest to the most powerful, have an equal entitlement to
participate in the process of customary international law."); MARK E. VILLIGER,
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A MANUAL ON THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF THE INTERRELATION OF SOURCES 62 (2d ed. 1997) ("All States participate

as equals in the formative process of customary law .... ").
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88
may serve as evidence that the practice is sustained and repeated.1
Opinio juris means that the examined practice is undertaken with a

sense of legal obligation.1 89 Unlike such hard law, soft law is a residual
90
category of "things that fall short of [hard] international law."1 Use
of soft law instruments and reliance on customary international law

has been increasing, and Laurence R. Helfer and Ingrid B. Wuerth
explain that the use of custom is likely to arise in particular situations
"where powerful states (or groups of like-mined [sic] countries) advance

new rules that respond to emerging global problems or seek to
distributional differences
overcome
compelling normative content."191

by

promoting

rules

with

To say that China's actions at the UN Human Rights Council and
UN Security Council promoting mutually beneficial cooperation have
solidified the expectation for win-win cooperation as currently
representing customary international law would be a gross
overstatement.
But by pushing to incorporate win-win cooperation into UN
Human Rights Council and UN Security Council documents and

resolutions,1 9 2 China creates a stronger foothold for arguments that
development-related win-win practices can serve as opinio juris
supporting the intertwined nature of development to human rights and
security. Although resolutions passed in the various organs of the UN

are the result of diplomatic compromises, the examples analyzed in the
previous Part demonstrate that such footholds are already being
93
Consider examples
created in customary international law.1

expansions

of

these

footholds.

Developing

on

the

of

UNAMA

&

188. See Andre da Rocha Ferreira, Cristieli Carvalho, Fernanda Graeff Machry
Pedro Barreto Vianna Rigon, Foundation and Evidence of Customary International Law,
1 UFRGS MODEL U.N. J. 182, 189-90 (2013).
189. See B. S. Chimni, Customary International Law: A Third World Perspective,
112 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-3 (2018) (citing Int'l Law Comm'n, Identification of Customary
International Law: Text of the Draft Conclusions Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting
Committee, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.872 at 3 (2016)). For examples of forms of evidence of
accepted state practice and opinio juris in the Draft Conclusions, see id. at 2-3, 3 n.7, 11
(citing Int'l Law Comm'n, Identification of Customary International Law: Text of the
Draft Conclusions Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/L.872 at 2-3 (2016)).
190. Guzman & Meyer, supra note 43, at 172; see also Dinah L. Shelton, Soft Law,
in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2008) ("Soft law is a type of social rather than
legal norm. While there is no accepted definition of 'soft law,' it usually refers to any
written international instrument, other than a treaty, containing principles, norms,
standards, or other statements of expected behavior.").
191. Laurence R. Helfer & Ingrid B. Wuerth, Customary International Law: An
Instrument Choice Perspective, 37 MICH. J. INT'L L. 563, 609 (2016) (exploring States'
choices to use soft law instruments to examine the role of customary international law
in contemporary international lawmaking).
192. See discussion supra Part III.A.
193. See id.
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discussions,1 94 China could act to block humanitarian-relief efforts to
an unstable region because the lack of development-related language
would represent an incomplete aid package. China's push for the

protection of human rights to remain a sovereign prerogative could one
day justify its treatment of the Uighurs as merely an exercise of state
discretion over its people or characterizing the "reeducation schools" as
a development effort.1 95
Furthermore, countries should be concerned about what a Chinadominated UN will mean for them. For the United States, a Chinadominated UN means a "steady erosion of U.S. values and interests in

matters
that range
from
nonproliferation
to sustainable
development."1 96 This parallels other concerns regarding the spread of
human rights abuses through digital authoritarianism,1 97 raising the
expectation that human rights abuses would be more frequent with a
China-dominated UN. Thus, the prospect of a China-dominated UN is
even more concerning given China's current position on the UN
Human Rights Council and UN Security Council.1 98
Customary international law brings some flexibility into the
international legal system "by allowing the emergence of some rules
without the consent of some states and by allowing other rules to

change over the objections of some states."1 9 9 Thus, simple objections
by states cannot prevent the formation of customary international law.
However, by objecting to China's methods, countries convert their

implicit approval into explicit disapproval and aid the process of
destabilizing the customary international law foundations being laid.

These concerns also arise when examined with a soft law lens. The
international community should be concerned about China's soft law
regime of BRI MOUs and the potential for its conversion to hard law.
The concept of hard law versus soft law is a controversial one, 200 but
its application warrants consideration for this issue.

See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
See discussion supra Part II.B.1; Part III.B.1 and accompanying notes.
196. Kristine Lee, Coming Soon to the United Nations: Chinese Leadership and
Authoritarian
Values,
FOREIGN
AFF.
(Sept.
16,
2019),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-09-16/coming-soon-united-nationschinese-leadership-and-authoritarian-values [https://perma.cc/AN38-J2W3] (archived
July 18, 2020). See also Drezner, supra note 5 ("The American foundations undergirding
the liberal international order are in grave danger, and it is no longer possible to take
the pillars of that order for granted.").
197. See discussion supra Part II.B.1 and accompanying notes.
194.
195.

198.
199.

See discussion supra Part III.A.
Andrew T. Guzman & Jerome

Hsiang,

Some

Ways

that

Theories on

Customary InternationalLaw Fails:A Reply to Laszlo Glutman, 25 EUR. J. INT'L L. 553,
557 (2014).
200. See Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives,
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REv. 706, 71215 (2010) (discussing the debated definitions of hard law and soft law and the relevance
of these concepts).

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

1466

[VOL. 53:1427

The definitions of hard law and soft law are unsettled, though a
commonly used distinction is that of binding and nonbinding,
respectively. 2 01 One view of this area of law is that hard law and soft
law instruments can be used as complements, with states strategically

using each to advance their policy objectives. 202 Some scholars argue
that states may use soft law instruments to establish "non-binding
standards that can eventually harden into binding rules once
20 3
uncertainties are reduced and a higher degree of consensus ensues."
That "soft law regimes can be 'hardened' through their links to other
regimes"20 4 seems to accurately describe the events analyzed in this
Note. The language and effects of the BRI MOUs, as well as China's
push for inclusion of particular phrases in UN Human Rights Council

and UN Security Council resolutions, are creating links between

China's policy goals and international peace, security, and human
rights. 205 By couching its goals in pursuit of promoting development,

China is creating a soft law regime that could eventually harden into
hard law without obvious

opportunities for objection from other

countries.20 6
The ultimate effect of the creation of customary international law
or hard law supporting China's particular policy efforts may seem faroff. However, that unappetizing future is not an inevitability. Short of

somehow convincing China to withdraw from its strategies, there is no
single practical solution to stop China from growing its soft power
through the BRI and as a member of intergovernmental organizations.

Thus, the following Part offers some suggestions for steps countries can
take, which, if taken together, can help discourage China's powergrowing practices, promote human rights, and encourage other states

to take actions expressing their own disapproval.

IV. WAYS TO MOVE FORWARD

The first question to address when considering solutions is tone:
Should states be acting reactively or proactively? The answer is both.

China's current actions through the BRI and as a member of the

Id. at 706, 712 & n.5.
202. Id. at 725 ("[S]tates sometimes prefer hard law and sometimes prefer soft law
to advance their joint policy aims.").
203. See David Trubek, Patrick Cottrell & Mark Nance, "Soft Law," "HardLaw,"
201.

and European Integration: Toward a Theory of Hybridity, in LAW AND NEW GOvERNANCE

IN THE EU AND THE US 89 (GrAinne de Bnrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006).
204. See Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 199, at 710.
205. See discussion supra Part III.A and accompanying notes.
206. For further analysis regarding the flexibility offered by the use of soft law
instruments, see Heng Wang, China's Approach to the Belt and Road Initiative: Scope,
Character, and Sustainability, 22 J. IN'L ECON. L. 29 (2019).
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Human Rights Council and UN Security Council require countries to
act responsively. In order to prevent an undesirable expansion of
China's influence, countries should also be looking to invest time,
money, and energy into their responsive actions to make them
prophylactic as well. By working to curb unfair and unjust practices
now, countries can help to prevent China from gaining overly
expansive power in the coming decades.
This Note does not propose a panacea. To take large, extreme
actions would be to use a hammer rather than a scalpel for a delicate
surgery. Just as China is using a wide range of actions to grow its soft
power, there is no single solution for how countries should act outside

of an extremely broad goal of working collectively to combat China's
expansive efforts. Instead, this Note focuses on providing a set of
actions that, if taken together, would substantially affect the most
immediate effects of the BRI while addressing the associated metaconcerns.

Specifically, this Note suggests that more members of the
international community increasingly engage and invest in developing

nations, encourage experts to analyze binding and nonbinding
international agreements and release guidelines on how the
agreements should be constructed, and continue to vocalize dissent at
the UN and with existing UN organizations

that have forged

partnerships with China with regard to the BRI to push for creation
and execution of commitments from China on protecting human rights

and the environment.
A. Increase Engagement and Investment in Developing Nations
One of the clearest ways in which countries can become involved
is by increasing their engagement with and investment in developing

nations. Lack of participation from the regular players means the door
is open for other countries to fill the role. 207 As seen through history
and now in the mechanics of the BRI, policy entrepreneurship can be a
powerful tool.2 08 Large countries like the United States, who have

207. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text. See also Moss, supra note 17
("[I]nstead of lecturing African countries to beware, the administration should reflect
upon why China seems to be so attractive to the region as it gains self-confidence. Today's
Africa does not want charity. It seeks more investment and a measure of respect. Chinabashing might be good political theater, but it makes for ineffective policy.").
208. See discussion supra Part II; see also Sarah E. Mendelson, How U.S. Officials
Can Craft Innovative Human Rights Policy: Reflections on Navigating the Bureaucratic
Landscape, FOREIGN AFF. (July 13, 2017), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/201707-13/how-us-officials-can-craft-innovative-human-rights-policy [https://perma.cc/8YY38KG3] (archived July 18, 2020) (".... U.S. officials can create innovative policies [under
the Trump administration]. The way to do so is to take the massive amounts of
information and issues that one is exposed to on a daily basis, recognize opportunities to
advance one's agenda, and gain the support of champions within and outside government
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already been vocal about their disapproval of China's practices at the
intergovernmental level, can support their own efforts by increasing

engagement and investment in the developing states targeted by
China's BRI.
The Trump administration's early efforts to quash longstanding

foreign aid policies passed by Democratic and Republican
administrations and slash federal development organizations' budgets
did not last long.20 9 In late 2018, the Trump administration made an
about-face 21 0 and signed the Better Utilization of Investments Leading
211
in an effort to respond to the BRI and
to Development (BUILD) Act
212
The
the actions of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

BUILD Act was a bipartisan effort signed in 2018 that consolidated the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation and USAID's Development
Credit Authority into the International Development Finance

Corporation (IDFC). 213 The IDFC was given a $60 billion USD budget
to focus the United States' foreign investment efforts, increase
transparency in the multilateral development investment space, and

temper Chinese economic influence. 2 14 Bipartisan support for the
BUILD Act in a time of deep political division in the United States

to implement and amplify the ideas. New ideas can stick if the leadership and the
organizational culture encourage policy entrepreneurship.").
209. See Glenn Thrush, Trump Embraces Foreign Aid to Counter China's Global
2018),
14,
(Oct.
TIMEs
N.Y.
Influence,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/14/world/asia/donald-trump-foreign-aid-bill.html
[https://perma.cc/558P-FNSU] (archived July 18, 2020).
210.

See id.

211. Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act, S. 2463, 115th
Cong. (2018).
212. See generally Daniel F. Runde, Romina Bandura & Owen Murphy, Strategic
Directions for the United States International Development Finance Corporation (DFC),
CTR. FOR STRATEGIC &
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-

INT'L

STUDS.

(Sept.

24,

2019),

https://csis-website-

public/publication/190923_RundeBanduraMurphyUSDFC_WEB.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N7LR-V7JQ] (archived Aug. 23, 2020) (examining the mandate and
vision for the DFC and offering recommendations on how the DFC should proceed to
support development and national security efforts); Matthew S. Erie, Indo-Pacific Legal
Infrastructure:A Chinese Perspective, 113 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 374 (2019) (writings
from a panel convened to discuss ways in which the Belt and Road Initiative offers novel
approaches to international economic law); Perlez, supra note 29.
213. See, e.g., John Campbell, President Trump Embraces Foreign Aid After Trying
to Gut It, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/blog/president[https://perma.ccW3WV-9ZR8]
trump-embraces-foreign-aid-after-trying-gut-it
(archived July 18, 2020) (describing the effects of the BUILD Act).
214. See, e.g., id. (noting the IDFC's budget and directives); U.S. International
HAITI,
Corporation,
U.S.
EMBASSY
Development
Finance
https://ht.usembassy.gov/business/u-s-international-development-finance-corporation-

dfc/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2020) [https://perma.c/ZVX5-R5MY] (archived July 18, 2020)
(explaining the functions and activities of the IDFC). An interesting aspect of the IDFC's
page on the U.S. Embassy in Haiti's website is the bottom section of the page explaining
how the DFC's offerings differ from those offered by China.
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highlights that any actions taken in furtherance of these objectives
must not themselves be political, that successfully hindering China's
growing influence will require this same bipartisan effort.
A major concern with this program is that China's financial power
is massive, and aiding states that may be vulnerable to the negative

effects of Belt and Road partnerships would insufficiently displace
Chinese investment. In this case, increasing the investment amount
would go a long way in achieving the goal of combatting China's
enormous influence in this area. According to the UN Conference on
Trade and Development, however, foreign direct investment worldwide
has dramatically fallen over the past four years. 2 15 In fact, global
foreign direct investment has fallen to its lowest level since 2010, and

a reverse in course is not expected. 216 Thus, a challenge to the
implementation of this step will be convincing governments to increase
their investments in a time of decline, especially in light of the ongoing
Covid-19 pandemic and its effect on national economies. However, it

appears that the pandemic has given the AIIB an opportunity to
broaden its role in the international community-in April 2020, the

AIIB announced that it would "double the size of its Covid-19 Crisis
Recovery Facility, set up to help member states battling the pandemic,
to $10 billion." 21 7 One would hope that the concern for China's actions,
as presented in this Note, would inspire these governments to change
their policies and increase foreign direct investment into Belt and Road
partner countries.

Furthermore, it must be noted that the goal of these efforts should
not be to entirely displace Chinese investment, but rather to aid
vulnerable states in gaining greater bargaining power to fight for fair
terms, adequate human rights, and environmental protections in their
dealings with China. As one scholar points out,
[d]irectly internalizing international economic,

international
agreements ..

labor

agreements,

and

social,

and cultural rights,

international

environmental

. into the long-term domestic regulatory frameworks governing

One Belt, One Road projects is one way of redressing the bargaining imbalance
for developing countries and ensuring mutual accountability for all global

215. See UNCTAD Report 2019, supra note 17, at x-xi (indicating that global
foreign direct investment had fallen over the three years leading up to this report); Paul
Hannon, ForeignInvestment Fallsto Near-DecadeLow as GlobalizationSlows, WALL ST.
J. (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/foreign-investment-falls-to-near-decadelow-as-globalization-slows-11579525200 [https://perma.cc/6ELK-NHFH] (archived July
18, 2020) ("New overseas investment by businesses around the world fell for the fourthstraight year in 2019 to its lowest level in almost a decade, pointing to a slowdown in
globalization as the world-wide economy cooled.").
216. Hannon, supra note 215 ("The 1% drop puts global FDI at its lowest level
since 2010, when many businesses shelved plans as they assessed the impact of the
financial crisis. The U.N. expects to see little change in the flows this year.").
217. Wilson, supranote 29.
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partners in China's push as a "responsible power" driving "Globalization 2.0"
218
bilaterally through the One Belt, One Road initiative.

Though most countries have some form of foreign-investment
program, this proposal requires that governments not only work to
increase these investments but also actively engage with the recipients
to ensure that their interests, as well as our greater global interests,

are protected. Thus, another concern with this approach is that
investing states' interests may overtake the receiving states' interests.
It will be crucial for investing states to keep their investments focused
on developing receiving states' infrastructure and economies.
Strengthening a receiving state's capabilities in this way will

ultimately allow the state to accept less money from China or at least
allocate them a stronger bargaining position when entering
agreements with China. In this way, focusing more intently on these
areas will serve the greater goal of lessening the impact of Chinese
investments.

B. Encourage the Development of Guidance
Given the confusion and harm inflicted by the asymmetric terms
of some BRI agreements, the UN Human Rights Council should pass a
resolution that the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee
analyze soft law instruments like the BRI MOUs through a human
rights lens, and release guidelines and recommendations on how the
agreements should be constructed. Guidelines on how such agreements

should be drafted and executed would, at a minimum, educate states
in or entering into BRI agreements with China. Such information

would give these states some leverage in negotiating the terms of their
MOUs by not only demonstrating that the international community

cares about these types of agreements and how they affect
contemporary international law but also creating concrete standards
to which these states can direct the consideration of a judicial body
during disputes regarding the construction or enforcement of the

MOUs.
Setting aside the current political realities of this solution for a
moment, the Human Rights Advisory Committee would be the

appropriate body to conduct this research. The Committee was
established to function as a think tank for the Human Rights Council
and has the ability to research the Human Rights Council's
recommendations. 2 19 The membership of the Human Rights Advisory

218. Desierto, supra note 17.
219. See Background Information on the Advisory Committee, U.N. HUM. RTS.
COUNCIL, https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hr/advisorycommittee/pages/aboutac.aspx
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Committee includes eighteen independent experts-five experts from
Asia, five from Africa, three from Latin America and the Caribbean,
two from Eastern Europe, and three from Western Europe and other

areas-from varied backgrounds who could offer special insights on
how various countries have been affected by their BRI partnerships. 22 0
Practically speaking, however, the politics of the moment likely
mean that such a resolution would not pass today. As a prominent
member of the Human Rights Council, China would be able to either
block the resolution or potentially reword it in a way that directs the
Advisory Committee to study how instruments like the BRI MOUs
promote states' abilities to protect human rights. This is derivative, in
part, of the progressive commingling between the right to development
and civil and political rights. Strong reaffirmation of the distinction

between these two areas will be necessary to effectively curb China's
cloaking of its
development. 221

human

rights

violations

under

the

guise

of

Another possible body from which to seek expertise is the ICJ. As
the principal legal organ of the UN, the ICJ can produce advisory
opinions on legal issues 222 referred by certain organs 22 3 and
agencies. 224 Unfortunately, much like the Human Rights Advisory

(last visited Feb. 21, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6V2C-TSRM] (archived July 18, 2020); see
also discussion supra Part III.A.1 and accompanying notes.
220.See Background Information on the Advisory Committee, supra note 219.
221. See discussion supra Part III.A.2 and accompanying notes regarding
UNAMA.
222. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 52 (July 8) (determining, on referral from the United Nations General
Assembly, after study of current customary and conventional international law that
there was no law expressly authorizing or prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear

weapons). Note also that the International Court of Justice's jurisdiction to administer
advisory opinions, when requested by a duly authorized organ or agency, is broad. See
Stefanie Pfahl, Is the WTO the Only Way? Safeguarding Multilateral Environmental
Agreements from International Trade Rules and Settling Trade and Environment
Disputes
Outside
the
WTO
1,
12
https://www.wto.org/english/forumse/ngoe/posp66greenpeacewtoe.pdf (last visited
Aug. 23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Y5JK-LLBC] (archived Aug. 23, 2020).
223. See id. at 12 n.3 ("General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social
Council, Trusteeship Council, Interim Committee of the General Assembly, Committee
on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgements.").
224. See id. at 12 n.4 ("International Labour Organisation (ILO), Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO),
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Finance

Corporation (IFC), International Development Association (IDA), International
Monetary Fund (IMF), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International
Telecommunication Union (ITU), World Meteorological Organization (WMO),
International Maritime Organization (IMO), World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), International Fund, for Agricultural Development (IFAD), United Nations
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA).").
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Committee, China may politically obscure access to the ICJ-China's
influence over many states in the General Assembly will likely allow

the country to block resolutions for such a referral. Perhaps the
International Monetary Fund could refer the matter to the ICJ. In the

Agreement between the International Monetary Fund and the UN, the
General Assembly authorized the International Monetary Fund to
request advisory opinions from the ICJ "on any legal questions within

the scope of the Fund's activities."225 The International Monetary
Fund's mandate was most recently updated in 2012 to include issues
of macroeconomics and the financial sector that affect global
stability. 226 Although the International Monetary Fund has yet to
227
the ability to refer a question
exercise this power since its inception,

to the ICJ is still available.
Other expert bodies equipped to handle this issue are the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Law Commission

(ILC). Nevertheless, there are different problems associated with these
organizations. First, the WTO does not have jurisdiction over the Belt

and Road MOUs, 228 the organization's Dispute Settlement Body
229
and the WTO is specifically geared
cannot give advisory opinions,

225. Agreement Between the United Nations and the International Monetary
Fund, art. VIII, Nov. 15, 1947, 16 U.N.T.S. 328. The full language of the provision reads
as follows:
The General Assembly of the United Nations hereby authorizes
the Fund to request advisory opinions of the International Court of
Justice on any legal questions arising within the scope of the Fund's
activities other than questions relating to the relationship between
the Fund and the United Nations or any specialized agency.
Whenever the Fund shall request the Court for an advisory opinion,
the Fund will inform the Economic and Social Council of the request.
See id.
226.

About the

IMF,

INT'L MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/en/About

(last

visited Feb. 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/43ML-BTYD] (archived July 18, 2020).
227. As of February 2020, the World Trade Organization has still yet to submit a
question to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. Cf. MARINA
FOLTEA, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: How MUCH
INSTITUTIONAL SENSITIVITY? 145 (2012) (citing JOSEPH GOLD, INTERPRETATION: THE

IMF AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 241 (1996)) (explaining that until 2012, the World Trade
Organization had not solicited any advisory opinions from the International Court of
Justice).
228. See discussion supra Part II.B.3 and accompanying notes.
229. The Dispute Settlement Understanding, which guides how a WTO panel may
adjudicate disputes, empowers a WTO panel to make findings that will assist the
Dispute Settlement Body in resolving such disputes. See Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, arts. 3.7, 7, 11, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401. Note that the United States has been vocal about how the Dispute
Settlement Body's power under the DSU does not allow it to issue advisory opinions on
issues that are not essential for resolving a particular dispute. See Statements by the

United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 10-26 (Oct. 29, 2018),
https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/290/Oct29.DSB_.Stmt_..asdelivered.fin_.rev_.public.pdf [https://perma.ec/6KCA-FTTJ] (archived Aug. 3, 2020).
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towards trade agreements and promoting international trade
generally. 230 Furthermore, the WTO has been silent on the Belt and
Road MOUs. Second, the International Law Commission does not have

the bandwidth to conduct this type of study and release a timely report.
Although the Statute of the International Law Commission would

permit the Commission to conduct such a study, 23 1 the ILC consists of
only thirty-four members 232 and has a laundry list of current
projects. 233 It is highly unlikely that the ILC could study and release a

report on the Belt and Road MOUs, let alone the more general realm
of soft law instruments, in the near future.
One more pertinent concern is whether China will follow such
guidance, regardless of the issuing body. If China is not involved in the
shaping of the guidelines in any way, there is a strong possibility that
it will otherwise dismiss them as illegitimate-but allowing China the
ability to influence this guidance is counterproductive to its purpose.
There may not be a way to ensure China follows suit, but at least the
study of these types of instruments and the creation of guidance would

create a basis for other states to pursue actions against material
breaches or enforcement of obligations.

C. Continue to Vocally Oppose ObjectionablePracticesat the United
Nations

Member states and human rights advocacy groups should partner
to lobby existing UN organizations with BRI partnerships to push for
the creation and execution of commitments from China on protecting
human rights and the environment.
Many UN agencies have developed partnerships with China for
the BRI. As of October 2018, twenty-five UN agencies have been
involved with the BRI. 23 4 The extent of involvement is varied amongst

the various agencies. Many have signed soft law instruments such as

230.

See

Who

We

Are,

WORLD

TRADE

ORG.,

https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whowearee.htm (last visited Feb. 15,
2020) [https://perma.cc/F3DU-5W8K] (archived July 18, 2020).
231. Statute of the International Law Commission, Nov. 21, 1947, U.N. Doc. A/519
(1947) [hereinafter ILC Statute].
232. Id.
art.
2(a);
see
also
Membership,
INT'L
L.
COMM'N,
https://legal.un.org/ile/ilcmembe.shtml
(last
visited
Feb.
22,
2020)
[https://perma.cc/QUW7-3UZ4] (archived July 18, 2020).
233.

See Current Status of the Work of the Commission and Forthcoming

Deadlines, INT'L L. COMM'N, https://legal.un.org/ilc/status.shtml (last visited Feb. 23,
2020) [https:/perma.cc/B2WB-QYYS] (archived July 18, 2020).
234. UN Agencies Belt and Road Initiative Involvement, U.N. (Oct. 1, 2018),
http://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/26318/UN%2OAgencies%20BRI
%20Involvement%2002%20%2801%200ct%202018%29.pdf?sequence=17&isAllowed=y
fhttps://perma.cc/ZM69-AFAG] (archived Aug. 3, 2020).
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23 7
while
MOUs, 2 35 Letters of Intent, 236 and Agreements of Cooperation
238
These
others have offered direct support for certain BRI programs.

organizations should leverage their partnerships to encourage these

agencies to use their position to round out the pressure exerted on
China. Unfortunately, this seems likely to be a losing battle-China's
already outsized influence may well prevent these actions from being
effective.

Therefore, member states should continue to actively voice their
concerns and disagreement with China on issues in both the UN
Security Council and the UN Human Rights Council. This can look

similar to the statements made by Permanent Representative de
Buytswerve and Ambassador Pierce-because negotiations often occur
behind closed doors, it was because of their public statements and other
239
similar comments that some of this Note's analysis was possible.
Voicing dissent is an important step to rejecting China's methods for

growing its soft power influence. Genuine concerns for this action
include how such statements may affect a country's relationship with
China, thus risking the possibility of overt or covert retaliation in other

areas of cooperation. Another concern is the potential loss of Chinese
support in initiatives requiring China's vote as a member of the
Security and Human Rights Councils. Although voiced concerns may,

at times, seem to fall on deaf ears, persistent rejection of China's push
for the inclusion of specific language in resolutions and especially in

general state practice (as may be exhibited through the Human Rights
Council Advisory Committee's studies) can contribute to preventing, or

235. UN agencies that have signed Memorandums of Understanding as of October
2018 include the United Nations Development Programme; the International Labour
Organisation; the UN Habitat; and the International Development Law Organisation.
See id.
236. UN agencies that have signed Letters of Intent as of October 2018 include the
World Meteorological Organisation; the International Maritime Organisation; and the
Universal Postal Union. See id.
237. UN agencies that have signed Agreements of Cooperation as of October 2018
include the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation; the International
Telecommunication Union; the World Intellectual Property Organisation; and the
International Civil Aviation Organisation. See id.
238. UN agencies that have offered support for the Belt and Road Initiative as of
October 2018 include the International Monetary Fund; the World Bank Group; the Food
and Agriculture Organisation; the International Organisation for Migration; the United
Nations Economic Commission for Europe; the United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Western Asia; the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific; the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organisation; the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; the
United Nations Children's Fund; the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation;
the World Tourism Organisation; the World Food Programme; and the International
Fund for Agricultural Development. See id.
239. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
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international law. 240

V.

CONCLUSION

Throughout history, countries have relied upon each other for
help-in times of war, in times of natural disasters, and even in times
of cooperation to promote international peace. No single country would
be what it is today without help from other countries. However, not all
forms of help are alike. If one looks with a narrow scope, BRI
partnerships have yielded great results for countries in improving
their domestic infrastructure, global connectivity, and access to their

own resources. But these successes do not exist in a vacuum, and each
had its own measure of associated costs.
Recall Alexis from the hypothetical in the Introduction. An
implicit assumption in that scenario is that the loan agreement
between Alexis and the bank would include fair terms and
consideration. This Note advocates that China's loan agreements with

BRI partners be treated similarly, regardless of the agreements'
proclaimed nonbinding nature. To accomplish this end, international
cooperation is necessary.
It is time for more of the international community to step up and

contribute to efforts to curb China's growing soft power by increasing
engagement and investment with developing nations and encouraging
an expert group to analyze binding and nonbinding international
agreements and release guidelines on how the agreements should be
constructed and handled differently. The international community
should also work with UN agencies that have already forged
partnerships supporting the BRI to push for strong Chinese

commitments to protect human rights and the environment.
Simultaneously, other states should continue to actively register
concerns and dissents when China takes objectionable actions. While

none of these actions are perfect, they are steps to reduce the negative
impacts of the BRI while still allowing countries to benefit from its
initiatives.
It is crucial that members of the international community act now
to signal disapproval of China's methods for increasing its soft power
and thereby hinder the development of customary international law

approving of such methods. While every sovereign nation is within its
rights to desire power, nations should not pursue such ends with
means that violate the sovereign duty to protect human rights.

240.

See discussion supra Part III.B and accompanying notes.
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"There is no crueler tyranny than that which is perpetrated under the
shield of law and in the name of justice."
- Charles de Montesquieu
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